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FOREWORD
The following pages contain the lectures delivered at
The First Natural Law Institute which convened at the
College of Law of the University of Notre Dame on
December 12th and 13th, 1947. This meeting was probably the first gathering in modem times by members of
the legal profession for the primary purpose of considering the natural law.
Participating in the First Natural Law Institute were
Clarence E. Manion, Dean of the College of Law; Reverend William J. Doheny, C.S.C., of the College of Law,
former Procurator and Advocate of the Tribunal of the
Apostolic Signatura and of the Sacred Roman Rota; Mr.
Mortimer Adler, Professor of the Philosophy of Law, University of Chicago; Mr. Harold R. McKinnon, of the San
Francisco Bar; and Mr. Ben W. Palmer, of the Minneapolis Bar.
ALFRED

Editor.

L. SCANLAN,

INVOCATION
The University of Notre Dame and the College of Law
are to be congratulated on this symposium, which is both
a religious and a patriotic endeavor. It is religious in that
it goes back to God as the Author of Order and Law; it is
patriotic in that it seeks to restore the fundamental philosophy of Law upon which the founders of our country
rested the rights of our citizens.
There were other philosophies of law in existence when
our country came into being, and the founding fathers
were well aware of them. In fact, it was to escape from
the tyrannies which they engendered that our ancestors
sought a home in America. The indictment of tyranny in
our Declaration of Independence is based squarely on the
recognition of God's Order in the universe, His Divine
Providence, and His Justice.
In the course of the many decades since our independence was declared, and since the Constitution was set up
to protect our God-given rights against the encroachments
of civil government, dry-rot has afflicted our jurisprudence, and some of the alien philosophies which our forefathers fled have found willing protagonists here in America. So much is this the case that the very existence of
the Natural Law is challenged, even in the highest courts
of the land. What five men think is the will, or even the
whim of people, may come to have the force of statute.
The "divine right of kings" was not a more pernicious
doctrine.

The Notre Dame College of Law has done a great thing
for our country by instituting this symposium. Some one
must challenge the false philosophy that has taken hold of
our schools of law and our courts. If we let it go longer,
there will be no liberty for us to defend. I congratulate
you and I ask God to bless your dcliberations.
MOST REV. JOHN F. O'HARA, C.S.C.

Bishop of Buffalo
Honorary Chairman
First Natural Law Institute Proceedings
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INTRODUCTION

O

Nofthe
walls of thea court-room
of themurals
Supreme
Court
Pennsylvania
series of artistic
represents
the several different kinds of law: American law, Roman
Law, divine law, natural law.
The natural law is represented by a fanciful scene in
which a nebulous figure of some misty period of antiquity
pours incense into a golden bowl of burning charcoal, and
the smoke curls upward around a marble colonnade, to
the obvious approval of a group of heroic-mystic noblemiened onlookers who breathe idyllic contentment.
The text accompanying the mural makes it clear that
the natural law is considered merely man's dream of a
golden age to come; it is the ideal law that will rule ideal
men in perfect harmony. It will never be attained; but
forever the hearts and minds of men will strive to achieve
that unattainable ideal.
The natural law is no such thing. It is not an ideal' it
is a reality. It is not a product of men's minds; it is a
product of God's will. It is as real and as binding as the
statutes in the U. S. Code. It is not a mere ideal toward
which all statutes and court decisions and systems of law
should tend. The actuality is that any statute or court
decision or system of law which does not conform to natural law simply has no valid binding force; it is inherently
vitiated. It lacks an element required for essential
validity.
The Natural Law Institute, sponsored by the College of
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Law of the University of Notre Dame, is publishing these
lectures in an attempt to explain what the natural law is,
and to dispel some widespread misconceptions of what
natural law is.
It is the purpose of the Natural Law Institute to explain
the meaning of the natural law in terms of actual statutes,
actual court decisions, and actual legal principles in our
American system. The basic philosophy of law underlying these lectures is utterly divergent from the positivism
of Justice Holmes and the relativism of Justice Cardozo.
It is here fundamentally postulated that the law is not
merely what a court says it is; nor that the principles of
law must change with changing times. It is here postulated that the controlling principles of law never change;
only the application of those principles to changing circumstances creates variation.
The Natural Law Institute is founded on the belief that
unless the unchanging character of basic legal principles
is acknowledged by our jurists, the basic legal guarantees
of liberty in our Constitution-which are principles of the
natural law-will be as changeable as the whim of future
judges and legislators.
The meaning of natural law has never been adequately
presented to the vast majority of American students of
law. This publication represents the beginnings of an
attempt to explain the natural law.
REV. JOHN

J. CAVANAUGH, C.S.C.,

Presidentof the University
of Notre Dame.

THE NATURAL LAW PHILOSOPHY OF
FOUNDING FATHERS
N the early summer of 1933 the Seventy-Third Congress
of the United States, in special session, passed what it
officially entitled the National Industrial Recovery Act.
In both House and Senate majorities favoring the measure were overwhelning. Pursuant to the provisions and
directions of this extremely comprehensive statute, industrial processes and procedures throughout the United
States were fundamentally readjusted at each and every
level of commercial activity. Jobbers, shippers, wholesalers, and retailers vied with each other in their eagerness
to come under the broad wings of the Blue Eagle, the
adopted symbol of the new industrial order. Under the
aegis of the ensuing National Recovery Administration a
country-wide organization of speakers brought the virtues
of the new legislation directly to the people of every
American community. In a remarkably short time practically everybody in the United States was talking in terms
of the N.I.R.A., and there was an all but universal popular acceptance of its expressed aims and purposes.
On the 26th day of July, 1934, the five Schecter brothers, all citizens of New York, were indicted for conspiring
to violate certain provisions of the new statute. They
were subsequently convicted and in 1935 their appeal
from this conviction was carried to the Supreme Court of
the United States. On April 1, 1935 the Supreme Court
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unanimously reversed the conviction and held the involved section of the N.I.R.A. to be in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, and, for that reason,
invalid.
This decision hit the Blue Eagle in a vital cross section
and death followed almost immediately. To the general
public the casualty was shocking and to some extent at
least, slightly mortifying. For two years we had heralded
and supported an institution that in legal contemplation
had never existed. In attempting to create and implement the National Recovery Administration two of the
six separated and distinct divisions of American Government had exceeded their proper constitutional authority
and the legally enforcible result of such excession was
exactly nothing. By the formal assertion of their innate
and reserved rights as individual persons, five men had
nullified an act of Congress together with innumerable
acts pursuant thereto by the President of the United
States. A great popular desire for N.R.A. was thus
thwarted. The same thing had happened many, many
times before in the history of the United States, but this
time it occurred in a most spectacular manner: an American citizen had successfully asserted an inherent substantive right against his own Government. Having proved
their point to its satisfaction, the court, as a matter of
course, rebuffed the Government, of which the court itself
was an integral part, and directed that the five Schecter
brothers go free. The result of this and similar decisions
of American courts of last report points up the practical
importance of natural law to the citizen of the United
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States. Nowhere else in the world of 1935 could individual citizens of any state challenge and set aside an
official act of their Government on the theory that such
act violated the citizens' reserved personal rights. This is
the important distinction upon which the whole body of
American legal and political science turns away from the
time-honored and so-called orthodox conception of sovereignty. It is the distinction which is constantly missed
or mangled by most foreign commentators on American
jurisprudence, for the simple reason that this feature of
our system is unique and quite definitely homegrown.
At Runnymede the English barons were seeking to
limit the tyrannical power of a recreant king who was out
of their control and quite beyond their reach. To bridle
such a menacing autocratic creature with the terms of
the Great Charter made very good sense, but we are now
constantly reminded by the realists that times have
changed. We are told that "Democracy" in the very
nature of things must be an absolute democracy and that
consequently constitutional limitations imposing checks
upon democratic officials are self-contradictory. The
realists thus conclude that a constitutional democracy is a
contradiction in terms.
Nevertheless, the Schecters, and countless Americans
before them, have personally profited by the availability
of these same checks on American officialdom. The question therefore arises: Are these available checks-the
Constitutions, the Bill of Rights, the separation of governments and the division of their powers-are these ends in
themselves or are they merely means to ends? Have the

6N
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Schecters, and others merely escaped into an ancient
petrified forest of antiquated forms and procedures of law,
or were the forms and procedures precisely made that
way for the purpose of holding and preserving some vital
and necessary substance? If our system of constitutional
limitations is an end in itself, it is defensible only as a
tradition, and the sands of purely traditional values are
rapidly running out today. On the contrary, if the letter
of these limitations is merely insulation for a well defined
concept of man's inherent and imperishable nature, then
a knowledge and evaluation of this concept is and must
be required of every American judge and all American
lawyers whose terrible and continuing responsibility it is
to uphold and defend our presently besieged system of
American law.
We can answer these significant questions only by a
recourse to that unusual generation of men which gave
us the words and phrases of the American constitutional
system. Many of the men to be consulted were renowned
and successful lawyers long before the American constitutional system was formally devised. These men were
trained and educated in the common law of England, but
most of them were products of the American frontier
where the administration of justice, like other things, was
largely homemade. For instance, Dean Roscoe Pound
tells us that "an English lawyer who came to Boston about
1637 wrote, in 1642, that the colonial tribunals ignored
English common law and sought to administer Mosaic
law." The Dean goes on to say that:
"Lawyers played a chief part in the contest with the
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Stuarts. They found their weapons in the doctrines
which had been worked out by the experience of the
common law courts in trying official actions by the
provisions of the Great Charter. Coke made the
cases under the Plantagenets the material for a commentary on Magna Carta, which made (this) treaty
between the paramount landlord and his tenants in
chief, a legal document defining limitations in the
relation of ruler and ruled. What the medieval cases
and traditions were to Coke, Coke's Second Institute
(Coke's Reports) and the decisions of the common
law courts he discusses or that followed him, were to
the American lawyers before the Revolution. * * *

So steeped were the Eighteenth Century colonial
lawyers in Coke's teachings, for Coke's Institutes
were the most authoritative law books available to
them, and they were dealing with a tradition and not
a code, that the controversial literature of the era of
the Revolution, if it is to be understood, must be read
or interpreted by a common law lawyer. Indeed he
must be a common law lawyer of the Nineteenth
Century type, brought up to read and reread Coke
and Blackstone until he got the whole feeling and
atmosphere of those who led resistance to the home
government.'
As Dean Pound points out, Coke's Common Law was
an uncodified tradition. It was an immemorial but an
inexact process of reasoning from the general to the particular. Coke himself was seldom if ever satisfied to rest
on Magna Carta as the bedrock foundation of the institution of English common law. "Common right and real The

Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, Roscoe

Pound 20 N. D. LAWYER 347, 348 (1945).
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son" were invariably used to bolster the Great Charter in
important cases. Magna Carta was not ipso facto binding but was evidentiary of concepts universally acknowledged and observed both before and since 1215. Coke's
Commentaries and Decisions are replete with his explanations of what these universally acknowledgd concepts
were. The following quotation from Coke's notes in
Calvin's case is typical:
"The Law of nature was before any judicial or
municipal law (and) is immutable. The law of
nature is that which God at the time of creation of
the nature of man infused into his heart for his preservation and direction; and this is the eternal law,
the moral law, called also the law of nature. And by
this law, written with the finger of God in the heart
of man, were the people of God a long time governed
before the law was written by Moses, who was the
first reporter or writer of law in the world. * * * God
and nature is one to all and therefore the law of God
and nature is one to all. * * * This law of nature

which indeed is the eternal law of the creator, infused into the heart of the creature at the time of his
creation, was two thousand years before any laws
written and before any judicial or municipal laws.
And certain it is that before judicial or municipal
laws were made, kings did decide cases according to
natural equity and were not tied to any rule or for'2
mality of law."
This is a fair digest of the fundamental principle upon
which all our pre-Revolutionary legal education was
based. The theistic element of this fundamental law was
2 Calvin's Case, 7 Coke's Rep. 12(a), 77 Eng. Rep. 392.
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certain to be enthusiastically received and developed in
and through the American Colonies, because religion of
one kind or another had been the motivation for the
establishment of each and every one of these colonies.
Theology was the subject which the colonists discussed
most passionately and it would have been very difficult
for the Seventeenth or Eighteenth Century American
mind to comprehend a strictly secular system of duties
and obligations. T he natural law expounded by Coke in
the Seventeenth Century, and by Blackstone in the Eighteenth, met colonial specifications perfectly. Blackstone's
Commentaries were for the most part a restatement of
Coke's principles in less archaic language and immediately after their first publication in 1765 they achieved a
wide circulation throughout the American colonies. A
special American edition of Blackstone was printed in
Philadelphia in 1771. Here are some pertinent excerpts
therefrom with which the founding fathers were obviously
familiar:
"When the Supreme Being formed the universe and
created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain
principles upon that matter from which it can never
depart and without which it would cease to be. * * *
This then, is the general significance of law; a rule
of action dictated by some superior being; and in
those creatures that have neither the power to think
nor to will, such laws must be invariably obeyed, so
long as the creature itself subsists, for its existence
depends on that obedience. But laws in their more
confined sense and in which it is our present business
to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in
general, but of human action or conduct, that is the

10
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precepts by which man * * * endowed with both

reason and free will, is commanded to make use of
those faculties in the general regulation of his behavior.
Man considered as a creature, must necessarily be
subject to the laws of his creator for he is entirely a
dependent being. A state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him on
whom he depends as the rule of his conduct * * *

in all those points wherein his dependence consists.
* * *

Consequently, since man depends absolutely

upon his maker for everything, it is necessary that
he should in all points conform to his maker's will.
This will of his maker is called the law of nature.
For as God, when he created matter and endowed it
with a principle of mobility, established certain rules
for the perpetual direction of that motion, * * * so,
when he created man, and endowed him with free
will to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid
down certain immutable laws of human nature,
whereby that free will is in some degree regulated
and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of
reason to discover the purport of those laws. * * *
The Creator is a being not only of infinite power and
wisdom but also of infinite goodness, therefore, he
has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and
form of humanity that we should want no other
prompter to inquire after and pursue the rule of
right but only our own self love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected,
so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice
with the happiness of each individual that (happiness) cannot be attained but by observing the former; and if the former be punctually obeyed it
cannot but induce (happiness). In consequence of
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which mutual connection of justice and human felicity (God) has not perplexed the law of nature with
a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts * * *
but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to
this one paternal precept that man shall pursue his
own true and substantial happiness. This is the
foundation of what we call ethics or natural law: for
the several articles into which it is branched in our
systems amount to no more than demonstrating that
this or that z ction tends to man's happiness and
therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the
other hand, that this or that action is destructive of
and therefore that the law of
man's real happiness
'3
nature forbids it."

Observe and remember the great commentator's conclusions with reference to the pursuit of happiness. That
phrase is due to make an official reappearance at the climax of the colonial contest with the mother country. It
is significant likewise that Blackstone speaks of the natural
law as "branched" into what he calls the English "systems." This could mean nothing except that the natural
law was accepted as the inspiration of the common law of
England. In another place he says:
"This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and
dictated by God himself, is, of course, superior in
obligation to any other. It is binding over all the
globe in all countries, and at all times; no human
laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such
of them as are valid derive all of their force and all of
3 Blackstone's Commentaries (Lewis' Edition) Vol. I,pp. 27-31.

12

NATURAL

LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

their authority
mediately or immediately from this
'4
origin."
It is not difficult to imagine the avidity with which this
reasoning was seized upon by the men who were then
protesting against what they called illegal and unwarranted encroachments of such Parliamentary measures as
the Stamp Act. But Blackstone contained still more comfort for those Americans who were at that time still manfully contending for their 'immemorial rights' as English
subjects. In one of the chapters of the Commentaries we
find that
"natural persons are such as the God of Nature
formed us; artificial persons are such as are created
by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies
politic. * * * By the absolute rights of individuals,
we mean those which are shown in their primary and
strictest sense, such as would belong to their persons
merely in a state of nature and which every man is
entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it. * * *
Hence it follows that the first and primary end of
human laws is to maintain (and regulate) these absolute rights of individuals. * * * The absolute
rights of man considered as a free agent endowed
with discernment to know good from evil, and with
power of choosing those measures which appear to
him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in
one general explanation and denominated the natural liberties of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit
without any restraint or control unless by the law of
nature, being a right inherent in us by birth and one
4 Ibid., p. 31.
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of the gifts of God to man at his creation when he
endowed him with the faculty of free will." 5
Such was the summation of the natural law-common
law fusion brought down to the very date of the Stamp
Act. It would be difficult to find a better brief for the
conclusions of the Declaration of Independence than is
contained in these and other materials from the great
English commentator himself. But while Blackstone's
version of the natural law-common law relationship was
comforting to the Americans, it did not surprise them. It
was merely a modem and timely restatement of what they
had always understood.
Two years before Blackstone was published young John
Adams wrote:
"It has been my amusement for many years past, as
far as I have had leisure to examine the systems of
all the legislators, ancient and modem, * * * and the
result * * * is a settled opinion that liberty, the un-

alienable, indefeasible rights of man, the honor and
dignity of human nature, the grandeur and glory of
the public and the universal happiness of individuals,
were never so skillfully and successfully consulted as
in that most excellent monument of human art, the
common law of England." 6
But the beautiful idol had acquired a clay foot. Blackstone gives us a peep at it when he says:
"Acts of Parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity; and if there arise out of
them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifest5 Ibid., pp. 108, 109.
6 Adams' Life and Works (1851), p. 440.
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ly contradictory to common reason, they are, with
regard to those collateral consequences, void. I lay
down the rule with these restrictions: I know it is
generally laid down more largely, that acts of Parliament contrary to reason are void. But if the Parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which
is unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary
that is vested with the
forms of the Constitution
7
authority to control it."1

The juridical issue of the American Revolution could
not be more compactly stated. In Bonham's Case, Coke
had said:
"And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
common law will control acts of Parliament, and
sometimes adjudge them utterly void; for when an
act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
common law will' control it and adjudge such an
action to be void."
This was in 1610. Coke died in 1634. In his exposition of the natural law-common law relationship, Blackstone appears to agree with his illustrious predecessor in
all things except the "power" of Parliament effectively to
override both natural law and common law. Blackstone
unquestionably agreed that Parliament had no "right" to
pass such a law. Something of the utmost importance to
English law had obviously happened between the commentaries of Coke and Blackstone respectively. That
occurrence was the English Revolution of 1688. Dean
Pound says that
7 Blackstone, op. cit. supra Note 3, Vol. V, p. 79.
8 8 Coke's Rep. 118(a).
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"the Revolution of 1688 made a profound change in
the English Constitution. The Seventeenth Century
polity as set forth in Coke's doctrine, was the one we
accepted at our Revolution and put into our constitutions. When these instruments declare themselves
the 'supreme law of the land' they use the language
of Magna Carta as interpreted by Coke, namely,
that statutes could be scrutinized to look into the
basis of their authority and if in conflict with fundamental law theyv must be disregarded. This doctrine
was as much a matter of course to the American lawyer of the early Revolution as the doctrine of the
absolute binding force of an act of parliament is to
the English lawyer of today. American lawyers were
taught to believe in a fundamental law which, after
the (American) Revolution they found declared in
written constitutions. After 1688 there was no fundamental law superior to Parliament." 9
It is most unfortunate that the romantic and psychological sidelights of the American Revolution have lured
historians away from the logical and legal aspects of that
epochal struggle. Taxes, parliamentary representation
and finally the very independence of the United States
itself were all incidental to the main and controlling legal
issue, namely the enforcement and implementation of a
law "superior in obligation to any other * * * coeval with
mankind and dictated by God himself." This controlling
issue was made crystal clear by the Declaration of Independence but for some reason modem historians seem
reluctant to take the great Declaration at its word. There
is a subtle but unmistakable effort to edit this document
9 Pound, op. cit. supra Note 1, p. 367.
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out of our jurisprudential system and to regard its categorical postulates as eccentric extravagances transposed
on the spot from a variety of foreign philosophical dreamers in order to make a rallying cry for a rather desperate
American cause. The fact is that the Declaration is the
best possible condensation of the natural law-common law
doctrines as they were developed and expounded in England and America for hundreds of years prior to the
American Revolution. By pushing and pursuing the principle of parliamentary absolutism it was England and not
America who abandoned the ancient traditions of English
liberty. In 1776 the British Government was insisting
that "the law of the land" and "the immemorial rights of
English subjects" were exclusively and precisely what the
British Parliament from time to time declared them to be.
This claim for parliamentary absolutism was at variance
with all the great traditions of the natural law and common law as recorded through the centuries from Bracton
to Blackstone. By abandoning their ingrained concepts of
the natural law, the colonists undoubtedly could have
made a comfortable settlement of their tax and navigation difficulties with England, but they chose the alternatives so well and so logically declared in the Declaration
of Independence.
The inference that the principles of the Declaration
were extravagant improvisations is refuted by the testimony of the times. Nearly half a century after the Declaration was adopted one Timothy Pickering wrote to John
Adams calling attention to the commonplace character of
pronouncements contained in the great document and
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manifesting surprise at the acclaim and reverence accorded to it. Adams replied on August 6, 1822. He said:
"As you justly observe, there is not an idea in it but
what had been hackneyed in Congress for two years
before. Indeed the essence of it is contained in a
pamphlet voted and printed by the Town of Boston
before the first Congress met, composed by James
Otis."
Pickering made Adams' letter the subject of a speech
delivered on the 4th of July in the following year (1823)
and Jefferson in turn paid his respects to Pickering in a
letter to Madison dated August 30, 1823. After a preliminary correction of Mr. Adams' recollection in certain
particulars, Jefferson wrote:
"I drew it (the Declaration) but before I reported it
to the Committee (Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, William Livingston, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson), I communicated it separately to Dr. Franklin
and Mr. Adams, requesting their corrections, because they were the two members on whose judgments and amendments I wished most to have the
benefit before presenting it to the committee: and
you have seen the original paper now in my hands
with the corrections of Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams
interlined in their own handwritings. Their alterations were two or three only and merely verbal. I
then wrote a fair copy, reported it to the committee,
and from them unaltered to Congress. This personal
communication and consultation with Mr. Adams,
he has misremembered into the actions of a subcommittee. Pickering's observations and Mr. Adams' in
addition 'that it contained no new ideas, that it is a
commonplace compilation, its sentiments hackneyed

18
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in Congress for two or three years before, and its
essence contained in Otis' Pamphlet' may all be true.
Of that I am not to be the judge. Richard Henry
Lee judged it a copy from Locke's Treatise on Government. Otis' Pamphlet I never saw, and whether
I had gathered any ideas from reading or reflection I
do not know. I know only that I turned to neither
book nor pamphlet while writing it. I did not consider it as any part of my charge to invent new ideas
altogether, and to offer no sentiment which had ever
been expressed before. Timothy (Pickering) thinks
* * * that the Declaration, as being a libel on the

Government of England, composed in times of passion, should now be buried in utter oblivion to spare
the feeling of our English friends and Anglo-men fellow citizens. But it is not to wound them that we
wish to keep it in mind: but to cherish the principles
of the instrument in the bosoms of our own citizens;
and it is a heavenly comfort to see that these principles are yet so strongly felt as to render a circumstance so trifling as this little lapse of memory of Mr.
Adams worthy of being solemnly announced and supported at an anniversary assemblage of the nation on
its birthday. In opposition, however, to Mr. Pickering I pray God that these principles may be eternal.""' (Italics supplied.)
Far from attempting to invent new theories and express
them in the Declaration, it was Jefferson's purpose, as he
later wrote to Henry Lee, Jr.:
"Not to find out new principles or new arguments
never before thought of, not merely to say things
which had never been said before; but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject in
10 Writings XV, p. 462.
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terms so plain and firm as to command their assent
and to justify ourselves in the independent stand we
were compelled to take. Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any
particular previous writing, it was intended to be an
expression of the American mind. All its authority
rests upon the harmonizing sentiments of the day.""
(Italics supplied.)
The authorship -f the Declaration was in Jefferson's
own estimation the first of the three highest achievements
of his remarkable life. He was chosen for that high honor
because of what Adams called Jefferson's "felicity of expression." To the best of his unusual ability he was
expected to mirror the prevailing American point of view

and, as we have seen, in Jefferson's own judgment he did
just that. In a very important sense it is misleading to
attribute the philosophy of the Declaration to the writings
of John Locke. The latter frequently confuses a point
that is vital to the American legal system; a point which
all of the influential American Revolutionary writers
made with full clarity and force. For instance, Locke
says:
"When any number of men have consented to make
one community or government they are thereby presently incorporated and make one body politic wherein the majority have the right to conclude the rest."1 2
Locke thus implies that once government is installed
by the consent of the governed the rights of individuals
and minorities are completely and absolutely subject to its
11 Writings V, p. 343.
12

Locke, Two Treatises on Government, Bk. II,Secs. 95-101.
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directions. This doctrine is inconsistent with the natural
law and natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of
Independence. It is at variance with the essays, pamphlets and correspondence that circulated so freely in
American Revolutionary times and thereafter. This theory was certainly not that of Thomas Jefferson. For instance on June 7, 1816, Jefferson wrote to Francis Gilmer
that:
"Our legislators are not sufficiently apprised of the
rightful limits of their power; that their true office is
to declare and enforce only our natural rights and
duties and to take none of them from us. No man
has a natural right to commit aggression on the equal
rights of another and this is all from which the laws
ought to restrain him. * * *

When the laws have

declared and enforced all this, they have fulfilled
their functions and the idea is quite unfounded that
on entering
into society we give up any natural
3
right."'
And again in his notes on Virginia he declared:
"An elective despotism is not the government we
fought for, but one which should not only be founded
on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided between the bodies of
magistracy as that no one could transcend their legal
limits without being effectually checked and restrained by others.' 1 4
John Adams said that:
"Rulers are no more than attorneys, agents, and trustees for the people," and he added that if these
13 Writings, XV, p. 24.
14 Ibid., II, p. 224.
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betray their trust "the people have to revoke their
authority" and substitute other agents, attorneys and
trustees. 15
The effective limitation of sovereignty and government
by division, judicial review, and democratic forces, was
thus held to be a necessary corollary to the doctrine of
unalienable natural rights. This was indeed, the significant contribution that the American Revolution made to
the doctrine of natural law. The views expressed in so
many different ways by so many of the Founding Fathers
during that critical period had all been expressed and
explored by others from time immemorial. It was the
Founding Fathers of the American Republic however,
who first did something about it. Their experience with
the voice of Coke and Blackstone on the one side and the
hands of Parliament on the other, convinced them that
Tom Paine was right when he urged that:
"Society is produced by our wants and government
by our wickedness; (that) society in every state is a
blessing but government in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one;
(that) government like dress, is the badge of lost
innocence-a mode rendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world.' 6
Revolutionary America believed that such an evil institution as government would certainly get out of hand
unless closely checked from every side. Just as firmly as
they believed in natural law and natural rights, therefore,
they believe in practical as well as theoretical checks upon
15 Works, Vol. III, pp. 456, 457.
16 Common Sense, p. 1.
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the possibility of governmental violation of those rights.
It was not enough, in the opinion of the Founding Fathers, to belabor sovereignty with sound philosophy.
Sovereignty had to be split and checked and degraded to
the point where it was obviously a servant of the people's
God-given rights. Their constitutional system put together by the Founding Fathers, was devised to keep this governmental servant in its place, and on the job, and its job
was "to secure these rights" of man.
There was little or no dissonance in the many widely
publicized American views on this point in the last half
of the 18th Century. While there was some difference of
opinion about the timing of the Declaration of Independence, there was no expressed dissent from the principles
which it so clearly and unmistakably announced. We
have Jefferson's own word that the document was previously and privately approved by John Adams and Benjamin Franklin. When it was submitted to the entire
Congress it was furiously and thoroughly debated. Large
sections of Jefferson's specifications against the King were
lifted out bodily and two significant additions were added
upon motion from the floor. These additions are very
much in point. At the opening of the second to the last
paragraph the Congress inserted the phrase "appealing
to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions" and in the last sentence of the same paragraph
the Congress inserted the words "with a firm reliance on
the protection of Divine Providence."
It is thus obvious that the important document was
carefully reviewed line by line by each of the signers, all
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of whom accepted the laws of Nature and of Nature's
God together with the significant "self-evident" truths in
their entirety and without the slightest question.
There were many who are certainly in the category of
Founding Fathers who were not present in, or members
of the Continental Congress when the Declaration was
adopted or signed. Washington was occupied with the
defense of New York City but we know from innumerable
sources that he was enthusiastic about the fact accomplished as well as the philosophy pronounced in the Declaration. Young Alexander Hamilton was also in uniform,
but as an undergraduate of King's College, later Columbia, he had already replied to "Westchester Farmers'"
criticism of the legality of the Continental Congress:
"Granting your supposition were true, it would be a
matter of no real importance. When the first principles of civil society are violated, and the rights of a
whole people are invaded, the common forms of municipal law are not to be regarded. Men may then
betake themselves to the law of nature; and if they
but conform their actions to that standard,all cavils
against them betray either ignorance or dishonesty.
There are some events in society to which human
laws cannot extend, but when applied to them lose
all their force and efficacy. In short when human
laws contradict or discountenance the means which
are necessary to preserve the essential rights of any
society, they defeat the proper end of all laws and so
become null and void. * * *

The sacred rights of

mankind are not to be rummaged for among old
parchments or musty records. They are written as
with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human na-
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ture, by the hand of Divinity itself and can never be
erased or obscured by mortal power." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hamilton's refutation incidentally reflects the religious
and philosophical nature of American college education
in those days. The currency of deeply religious and philosophical approaches to political and legal questions by
the college trained leaders of the Revolution, is explained
by the fact that from their very beginning all American
colleges in existence at the time of the Revolution were
closely related to the churches, and every one of them featured courses in theology and moral philosophy.
At the time the Declaration was adopted two distinguished Americans were at work in Virginia drafting the
first Constitution of that State. This Constitution began
with its famous declaration of rights-from that day to
this, a model for all similar sections in the constitutions of
every state of the Union. The author of this document
was George Mason, but James Madison, later to become
known as the "Father of the Constitution of the United
States" was responsible for the phraseology of that provision which declared freedom of conscience to be a natural right and not merely an object of toleration. The
Virginia declaration states that "all men are by nature
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
rights of which when they enter into a state of society,
they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity, namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety." In his long and dis-
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tinguished career Madison was never to lose his respect
for these natural law principles. George Mason's devotion to the natural law doctrine was well known.
While arguing the case of Robin v. Hardaway17 before
the Virginia General Court in 1772 Mason declared:
"Now all acts of legislation apparently contrary to
natural rights and justice are in our laws and must
be in the nature of things, considered as void. The
laws of nature are the laws of God, whose authority
can be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from
whose punishments they cannot protect us. All
human constitutions which contradict His laws we
are in conscience bound to disobey. Such have been
the adjudication of our courts." (Italics supplied.)
Mason cited both Coke's Report of Bonham's Case
and Calvin's Case in support of his argument.
One who looks for the spirit behind the letter of the
American Constitutional system will find it embodied
clearly in Mason's argument. Knowing at once the
source of rights as well as the dangers which threatened
them, Mason was well qualified to write a model bill for
their protection. It will also be observed from this case
that American Colonial courts in pre-revolutionary days
were constantly hearing arguments and deciding cases on
the natural rights theory projected by Coke as a basic
principle of the common law.
Time and space limitations force us to forego reviewing
the natural law declarations of such staunch and learned
revolutionary patriots as Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams,
17 1 Jefferson's Va. Rep., 109.
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John Dickinson, the Carrolls, the Pinckneys and many
others. Of James Otis who sparked the Revolutionary
struggle at its very outset by his courage and eloquence.
at least this must be lifted from his pamphlet on the
"Rights of the British Colonies":
"To those who lay the foundation of government in
force and mere brutal power, it is objected, that their
system destroys all distinction between right and
wrong; that it overturns all morality * * * leads directly to scepticism and ends in atheism. When a
man's will and pleasure is his only rule and guide
what safety can there be either for him or against
him, but in the point of a sword?
That the common good of the people is the Supreme
law is of the law of nature, and part of that grand
charter given to the human race (though too many
of them are afraid to assert it) by the only monarch
in the Universe Who alone has a clear and indisputable right to absolute power because He is the only
one who is omniscient as well as omnipotent."
Finally, there is the great James Wilson of Pennsylvania. Wilson was one of only six men who signed both
the Declaration of Independence and the Constituiton of
the United States. In addition to this distinction he was
one of the first group of justices appointed by President
Washington to the United States Supreme Court. Because of this unusual continuity of service in the development of American constitutionalism, Wilson's views
should provide a good concluding summary of the political philosophy which flowed from the Declaration of
Independence into the "Supreme Law of the Land." Wilson was educated in the Universities of Scotland, and
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after coming to this country at the age of 23 he read law
in the office of John Dickinson in Philadelphia. He was
active in the politics of Pennsylvania from the very beginning of his residence there and by the time of his service
in the Constitutional Convention he had attained undisputed leadership in the legal profession of America. Wilson's writings and lectures are voluminous.
All of these reveal a consistent devotion to the principles of the "Law of Nature" as it had been understood
and developed in the American tradition. In his lecture
upon this subject he says
"that our Creator has a supreme right to prescribe a
law for our conduct, and that we are under the most
perfect obligation to obey that law, are truths established on the clearest and most solid principles. * * *
(God) being infinitely and eternally happy in Himself, His goodness alone could move Him to create
us, and give us the means of happiness. The same
principle that moved His creating moves His governing power. The rule of His government we shall find
to be reduced to this one paternal command: let
man pursue his own perfection and happiness. What
an enrapturing view of the moral government of the
universe! Over all, goodness infinite reigns, guided
by unerring wisdom and supported by Almighty
power. * * * What is the efficient cause of moral
obligation-of the eminent distinction between right
and wrong?
* * * I give it (the question) this
answer, the will of God. This is the Supreme Law.
In compassion to the imperfection of our internal
powers our all-gracious Creator, Preserver and Ruler
has been pleased to discover and enforce his laws by
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a revelation given to us immediately and directly
from himself. This revelation is contained in Holy
Scriptures. The moral precepts delivered in the
sacred oracles form a part of the law of nature, are
of the same origin, and of the same obligation operating universally and perpetually. On some important subjects, those in particular which relate to the
Deity, to Providence and to a future state, our natural knowledge is greatly improved, refined and
exalted by that which is revealed. On these subjects
one who has had the advantage of a common education in a Christian country, knows more and with
more certainty than was known by the wisest of the
ancient philosophers. * * * The law of nature is
universal. For it is true, not only that all men are
equally subject to the command of their Maker, but
it is true also that the law of Nature having its foundation in the constitution and state of man, has an
essential fitness for all mankind and binds them without distinction. * * * We may infer that the law of
nature though immutable in its principles will be
progressive in its operations and effects. In every
period of his existence the law, which the divine
wisdom has approved for man will not only be fitted
to the contemporary degree but will be calculated to
produce in future a still higher degree of perfection."'
As a Supreme Court Justice it was to be expected that
one with such a philosophy would see the constitutional
limitations of American government not as ends in themselves, but as a means merely for the preservation of man's
natural God-given integrity. Questions involving "Reasonable Exercises of the Police Power" and substantive
18 Wilson, Works, Vol. V, p. 95 et seq.
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"Due Process of Law" would carry sharp challenges to a
man like James Wilson, just as his brilliant and moving
lecture on the Law of Nature from which the foregoing
quotations are taken, should carry a sharp challenge to
every American lawyer today. Fortunately for America,
Wilson's generation was able to distinguish the hedonistic
demands for human delights and comforts from the Godgiven right to pursue one's "true and substantial happiness." These are thoroughly reasonable distinctions it is
true, but as Wilson acknowledged, for full clarity and
consistency in these confusing cases reason needs the assistance of a firm faith in the Divine order of things. The
codes of constitutions which proceeded with such orderly
precision and logic from the American Revolution was
but the crystallization of a creed. From Massachusetts to
Georgia and from the Atlantic to the Alleghenies it was
the will of God in all places that underlay the supreme
law of the land. Unless one understands its vitalizing religious principles our unique form of government laboring
with its separations, divisions, checks, balances, vetoes,
and judicial reviews seems ever ready to collapse under
the onerous weight of its own retarded processes. It is a
far cry from the Stamp Act to the Schecter case and it is
understandable that the Founding Fathers are having increasing difficulty in making themselves heard today.
Meanwhile, and ever more and more precariously, we
continue to be the one remaining country on earth where
the individual may protect his God-given rights against
his own government and everybody else.
Dean Clarence E. Manion

THE NATURAL LAW AND PRAGMATISM*
N a psychological movie, to agitated quivering strings
rising to clamorous brassy crescendo, we see through
the eyes of a distraught victim of psychosis the clear
facade of a Grecian temple quiver, blur, and then with
almost unendurable blast of trumpets and clash of cymbals turn into Gothic cathedral, stream-lined office building, or hovel. Suddenly we see reality.
So it is that many times in the history of civilization
crowds casually, inattentively passing by the temple of a
great institution or thankfully sheltered within, have been
unaware of subtle changes in the institution or the erosion
of slow but sure-footed time. Each intent on his own busy
traffic of the streets or his personal problems at the shrine
of his devotion, has failed to note any of those hairline
cracks in foundation or in pillar that are individually
impotent but collectively disastrous. No Samson has
dramatically braced himself between the pillars and in
flagrant warning bellowed forth his intention of destruction. At once the building, to casual eye imperishable,
collapses into ruin. Or, more likely, as in a psychotic
dream or fevered vision, the beholder, as with eyes newopened, suddenly realizes that this which he had supposed to be a temple for the unified worship of a single
god had gradually become, years ago, an arena of bloody
conflict.
This, of course, is but another way of referring to the
30
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familiar time lag in social institutions and ideological
structures. More specifically it refers to those subtle, generally unperceived-at-the-time changes in individual
thought and emotion which collectively and in retrospect
visibly result in a revolutionary change in the dominant
philosophy of a people or an age. It is renaissance, reformation, or enlightenment in which the leading actors
play their parts more or less consciously, perhaps with
some dim adumbration of the end result. But for the
supernumerary and acted-upon masses there is no pace
perceived.
Ours is the task with humility but with courage, by the
grace of God to help give the people the vision without
which they perish. That vision must begin with a cleareyed appraisal and a close scrutiny of the present house
of the law. We must test its foundations and scan its supporting pillars. And we must consider the effect of its
environment upon the stability of the structure and upon
the people seeking shelter within its walls. We must consider the law in its relations to all the thought and feeling
of the time.
For isolationism in thought is, of course, impossible.
And whether the law be product of reason or emotion or
of both in infinitely varying proportions, the pretensions
of Austinian jurisprudence to be self-sufficient could not
stand in the face of the development of the social sciences
in the last one hundred years. And so we go back a
century.
Absolute truth existing and approachable by human
reason, if not always unerringly attainable, natural law as
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the measure of positive law, unalienable rights; these represented the philosophic teaching of American universities and colleges until well into the nineteenth century.
These were the convictions of the Founding Fathers. So
it was that Hamilton, with the perennial exuberant confidence of youth, wrote that "the sacred rights of mankind
...written

in the whole volume of human nature by the

hand of Divinity itself.., can never be erased or obscured
by mortal power." But let us trace the obscurement if
not the erasure.
Let us turn to the second administration of Andrew
Jackson, the embodiment of the American frontier and
see whether a change had not become apparent. For in
1835 de Tocqueville opened the second part of his Democracy in America with the words: "I think that in no
country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. The Americans have
no philosophical school of their own, and they care but
little for all the schools into which Europe is divided, the
very names of which are scarcely known to them."
Perhaps we may go beyond de Tocqueville's 1835 and
take 1859 as the year of beginning. For that year saw the
publication of Darwin's Origin of Species and saw but did
not perceive the birth in far-away Vermont of John
Dewey. Of Darwin we shall speak later. Of Dewey today we find such statements as these: "Dewey is the
spokesman of our age." (James Harvey Robinson) "He
is the most influential thinker of the past three generations." (Sidney Ratner) "He is the most profound and
understanding thinker on education that the world has
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yet known." (Ernest C. Moore) "In the profoundest
sense Dewey is the philosopher of America." (Herbert
W. Schneider) "John Dewey is the dominant figure in
American philosophy today. A host of disciples look upon
him as the great intellectual liberator of our times....
It is largely as a result of his analysis that the greater part
of traditional philosophy is finally revealed as an elaborate art of self-deception-a quest for an illusory goal."
And finally, to make an end of it, we quote Sidney
Hook who begins his book in honor of Dewey: "The philosophy of John Dewey represents a distinctive contribution to the thought of the modern age. He has carried to
completion a movement of ideas which marks the final
break with the ancient and medieval outlook upon the
world. In his doctrine the experimental temper comes
to self-consciousness. A new way of life is proposed to
realize the promise of our vast material culture. Organized intelligence is to take the place of myth and dogma
in improving the common lot and enriching individual
experience."
But before we consider the sweep of Dewey's influence
and that of pragmatism let us recall the familiar story of
the origin and chief points of development of that school
of thought. Then we shall attempt to sketch the reasons
for its wide reception and profound influence.
The particular philosophy, taught or dominant in
school or college among any people at any time, is of
course of primary importance. And even the thought of
a contemporaneously unknown or long-forgotten scholar,
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if seminally potent can be overlooked or ignored only at
peril to the common good. For it may germinate and
capture the minds of dominant philosophers in the
schools. From thence it may sally forth in the hands of
philosophers amateur and professional, enthusiastic popularizers and preachers, ecclesiastical and lay, to become
the dominant philosophy of a dominant democratic majority in a vast continental democracy of 140,000,000 souls
dominating or semi-dominating the modem world.
In 1878 Charles S. Peirce published in PopularScience
Monthly his then generally unnoticed but now famous
article entitled How to Make Our Ideas Clear. As a laboratory scientist his purpose was-to use his words-to
apply "the fruitful methods of science" to "the barren
field of metaphysics." The a priori method for fixing
belief makes a thing true when it is agreeable to reason.
But this sort of truth, said Peirce, varies between persons.
For what is agreeable to reason is more or less a matter of
taste. Parenthetically we may note here what we shall
later have occasion to suggest, namely the pragmatist distrust of metaphysics and its generally anti-intellectualist
or anti-rational spirit. The method of science, said Peirce,
avoids the variance of individual opinion. The heart of
his doctrine is in these words: "The action of thought is
excited by the irritation of a doubt and ceases when belief
is attained; so that the production of belief is the sole
function of thought.... To develop a meaning we have
simply to determine what habit it produces.... We come
down to what is tangible and practical as the root of every
distinction of thought . . . and there is no distinction so
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fine as to consist of anything but a possible difference in
practice."
Peirce's doctrine slumbered for twenty years. And then
in 1898 came forth its great apostle and champion William James. It was he, of course, who was to elaborate
the doctrine into a full-blown theory of truth and give it
wide currency by an emotional drive and an ingratiatingly popular style. The drive and style were suggestive of
the manner in which Justice Holmes was to win converts
to the same cause in the field of law. In 1904 in the first
volume of the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods James said: "Suppose that there are two
different philosophical definitions, or propositions, or
maxims, or what not, which seem to contradict each other
and about which men dispute. If, by assuming the truth
of the one, you can foresee no practical consequence, at
any time or place, which is different from what you would
foresee if you assumed the truth of the other, why then
the difference between the two propositions is no real difference-it is only a specious and verbal difference,
unworthy of future contention.... There can be no difference which does not make a difference-no difference
in the abstract truth which does not express itself in a
difference of concrete fact, and of conduct consequent
upon that fact, imposed upon somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen."
In 1907 in his Lowell lectures, referring approvingly to
Dewey and to Schiller, James used the now familiar
words: that truth "means nothing but this, that ideas
(which themselves are but parts of our experience) be-
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come true just insofar as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience.... Any
idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that
will carry us prosperously from one part of our experience
to another part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor, is true for just so much,
true insofar forth, true instrumentally. This is the 'instrumental' view of truth ...the view that truth in our ideas
means their power to 'work'. ...
True ideas are those
that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify.
False ideas are those that we can not .... This function
of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification. You can say of (a truth) either that 'it is useful
because it is true', or that 'it is true because it is useful'.
Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely
that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified.
True is the name for whatever starts the verification
process, useful is the name for its completed function in
experience.... The true, to put it very briefly, is only
the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the
right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.
Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the
long run and on the whole of course."
John Dewey was the great expositor of pragmatism
in America. His writings and those of others of the school
are so voluminous, sometimes contradictory and ambiguous, and there are so many brands of pragmatism that it
is impossible here to do more than state briefly and without qualification its main characteristics.
There is no absolute truth, no necessary truth. Truth
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is not transcendent or eternal but only hypothetical and
ambulatory. "There is no general truth except postulated truth resulting from some motivated determination
of the will." More accurately speaking, there is no truth
but only successive truths, accepted tentatively and provisionally if they give promise of workability at a given
time, for a given purpose and in a given environment.
They are true so long as they work and no longer. They
are constantly put to the test of experience and discarded
as false as soon as they cease to work, that is to give satisfaction. Furthermore all truths are empirical; they are
made by men and they are products of the will. As James
said: "The willing department of our nature .

.

. domi-

nates both the conceiving department and the feeling
department." Truths are instruments used by men to
adapt themselves to their environment and to change
their environment. And so too logic is identified with
functional psychology. Thought is valid if it serves the
needs of the organism, satisfactorily controls conduct. It
is mere illusion or verbiage to say that thought apart
from function may possess intrinsic or formal validity.
Formal logic is a farce.
The effect of willing on knowing, the subjectivism involved in "satisfactoriness" as the test of truth, the use of
logic as a flexible tool for the achievement of purpose, the
succession of variable hypothetical truths, were allied to
a general contempt for metaphysics, a distrust of principles in favor of concrete facts, and a marked anti-intellectualism-distrust of reason.
One of the purposes of James in proposing pragma-
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tism was to clear the decks of metaphysical problems and
though Dewey in recent years may have shown some turn
towards metaphysics, he has often expressed his scorn for
"general answers supposed to have a universal meaning"
such as "dissertations on the Family and dissertations on
the sacredness of individual personality." These, he says,
"do not assist inquiry. They close it." So, pragmatists
in general have ignored or scorned metaphysics. It is true
that we must be on guard against being content with unscrutinized abstractions as giving finality of truth or
knowledge. But we cannot overlook the fact that for
pragmatists generally the phrases "sterile metaphysics",
"barren abstractions", "empty verbalisms" and "pernicious abstractions" have become cliches. These are
catchwords for them, as R. L. S. would say, to "rap out
upon you like an oath and by way of argument." They
are to knock you down with a single blow if you are so
"naive"-to use their favorite word-as to refer to a generalization or principle. For them these are too often
irrelevancies or rationalizations unworthy of the intellectually sophisticated adult.
James inveighed against what he called "perverse abstraction-worship", that absolutism which he said had a
certain "sweep and dash about it", but was "remote and
vacuous", possessed of "that unreality in all rationalistic
systems by which your serious believer in facts is apt to be
repelled." "The world to which your philosophy professor introduces you," he said, "is simple, clean, and noble.
... Its architecture is classic. Principles of reason trace
its outlines, logical necessities cement its parts. . . . In
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point of fact it is far less an account of this actual world
than a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary in
which the rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and gothic character which mere facts
present. It is no explanation of our concrete universe, it
is another thing altogether, a substitute for it, a remedy,
a way of escape." So typically pragmatic is the Holmesian phrase of Walter Hamilton: "To my untutored mind
philosophy is an omnipresence dwelling with the absolute
in the upper stratosphere, eternally occupied with frigid
certainty."
Here are further familiar words of James: "A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of
inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He
turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.
He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards
facts, towards action and towards power.... It means
the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma,
artificiality and pretense of finality in truth.... It agrees
with nominalism for instance in always appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical
results; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions,
useless questions and metaphysical abstractions."
As Peirce said that what is agreeable to reason is more
or less a matter of taste, so James, approaching his famous classification of men into the tender minded and the
tough, said that the philosopher's "temperament really
gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly ob-
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jective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way
or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more
hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that
principle would." In words echoed by Holmes and the
legal realists he concludes "the potentist of all our premises is never mentioned." And elsewhere he declared that
the history of philosophy largely bears out the saying of an
eighteenth century philosopher that reason was given to
men chiefly "to enable them to find reasons for what they
want to think and do." On this premise Dewey goes on
to refer to "that dishonesty, that insincerity characteristic
of philosophic discussion." Salutary as warnings may be
against concealed prejudice, unconscious bias, emotions
or subconscious forces deflecting the needle of truth from
its objective goal, surely here is pragmatist attack on reason, distrust of intellectual processes, skepticism of arriving at truth. And it reminds one of the old phrase of
Cardinal Newman's about poisoning the wells of controversy.
Difficult as it is to classify the philosophy of a people,
hazardous the generalization, one need not be an idolator
of Dewey to say that pragmatism during the last half century has come to represent or express dominant American
thought. If we may say with de Tocqueville that Americans have no philosophical school of their own we may
also agree with him that "it is easy to perceive that almost
all the inhabitants of the United States conduct their understanding in the same manner, and govern it by the
sames rules; that is to say, without ever having taken the
trouble to define the rules, they have a philosophical
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method common to the whole people." Certainly a common method governs economic and political life, literature, the arts and sciences and secular education in
America today. Whether as method, point of view, theory of truth or reality, pragmatism is everywhere. The
causes for its ready and wide acceptance are not far to
seek. For it was advanced at an opportune time in a favoring environment. Its seeds fell on a congenial soil
well plowed and fertilized for their reception.
Reformation, Enlightenment, Cartesianism, positivism.,
capitalism, the type of European so-called liberalism condemned in the Syllabus of Errors, the secularization of
modern life and the dominance of the bourgeois mind
with its materialism; all these were background and setting for Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis with its revolutionary ramifications in every field of thought and for the
dramatic triumphs of the physical sciences during the last
one hundred years.
Evolutionary theories, widely popularized, shook the
faith of many in revealed truth who had accepted the
book of Genesis as a scientific textbook and therefore incined or led them to skepticism of all absolute truth.
Studies of the evolution of ideas and of changes in concepts of truth led to the belief that all truth is transitory.
Later the laws of nature were regarded as themselves the
product of evolution and hence limited rather than absolute. Thought and therefore truth were regarded as
instrumental to adaptation of the organism to its environment and the product of the will as weapons in the struggle for existence. Philosophy was not a purely objective
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intellectual product; it was the product of changing folkways and the thinker's changing environment. So for
Savigny legal principles lacked temporal stability; they
changed to give expression to the changing life of the
people and the silent pressure of their desires. Institutions evolved; truth evolved. That which was true yesterday might not be true tomorrow. And through it all was
a growing distrust of man's reason because of his supposed
kinship to the ape. And allied to this was the cult of
progress.
The cult of progress appealed to the optimism and the
self-confidence of Americans and to those who sought
escape from a rigid fatalistic determinism that was purely
materialistic. These found in evolution, especially interpreted by John Fiske as leading from the animal to the
spiritual, as Henry Adams said, "a safe, conservative,
practical, thoroughly common-law deity." And the
struggle for existence was admirably adapted to the
individualistic laissez-faire capitalism of the last half of
the nineteenth century.
But the great idol of the age was modem, predominantly materialistic science. Its achievements penetrated every
nook and cranney of every man's life, bringing him increased comfort and convenience and release from irksome toil, astonishing him with the coruscating miracles
of steam, electricity, the physical and chemical sciences
and the visible triumphs of modem engineering skills. He
was master of his environment, lord of creation. And the
secret of the genie lay in scientific methods: induction,
the piling of sensible fact upon fact, the test of thought
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by action, practice so startling that it obscured the theory
upon which its success was based, the use of successive
hypotheses as instruments of scientific progress. This last
was a powerful factor in leading men to look upon all
truth as tentative and provisional, promptly to be
scrapped and replaced by a newer model the moment
its practical usefulness was doubted.
Leaders of the newer social sciences looking with envious eyes at the ach.evements of the physical sciences and
hearing the plaudits of the multitudes decided that they
would go and do likewise. They concentrated on facts,
distrusted theories and abstractions and the a priori;
above all they determined to be rigidly objective and
therefore to exclude all ethical, moral, and supernatural
considerations from their studies. The quantitative approach, in later days the statistical, was favored at the
expense of the qualitative. The latter was suspected as
too subjective and subject unduly to the personal bias of
the investigator. It was believed that somehow understanding and wisdom would emerge if you persevered long
enough in laboriously accumulating and classifying vast
quantities of carefully verified facts, though classification
was sometimes suspect since it might involve those despised or feared things called categories.
So let us scan the social sciences.
Colonial colleges from the founding of Harvard to the
revolution were dominated by religious and ethical influences. From the revolution to the civil war courses in
moral philosophy were common and required. Paley,
author of the most popular text during most of that peri-
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od, said "Moral philosophy, morality, Ethics, Casuistry,
Natural Law, mean all the same thing: namely, that science which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it."
And "political philosophy is, properly speaking, a continuation of moral philosophy; or rather, indeed, a part
of it."
The purpose of courses in political theory was ethical
and moral philosophy included ethics, politics and economics. Burlamaqui and Vattel were the basis of lectures on the law of nature and of nations. Just before
the civil war Francis Lieber's works appeared, the first
American treatises on political science. His object was
to show how principles of ethics are applied to politics.
By 1865, however, old-time texts in moral philosophy had
been generally discarded. The newer texts struck an
ethical note but it was rather from the standpoint of the
individual. One writer indicated a new trend as early as
1841 when he wrote: "Questions as to the best organization and the best form of society . . . are not so much

questions of duty as of art. They are the object of the
two sciences of politics and political economy, which are
quite distinct from ethics." Between 1865 and 1900 political science emerged as a separate discipline. The
beginning of the "secular upheaval" may be assigned to
1869 when Charles W. Eliot became president of Harvard. In the latter half of the century moral philosophy
became individual ethics. During that period interest in
politics shifted from courses in moral philosophy and from
classical courses which had not yet become narrowly linguistic to history, particularly courses in constitutional
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history. By the late eighties, however, interest in that
subject had definitely failed. The shift was now to political, economic and social history. Men were beginning
to concentrate on descriptive studies of practical politics,
elections, political corruption, administration, and local
government, and this was being carried on in separate
departments of political science. By the beginning of the
century courses in political science were being given to
large numbers of college and university students because
of increased enrollment and because the subject had been
opened to the students down to the freshman year. There
was little interest at this time in political theory; courses
concentrated on "actual government." As in other social
sciences aping the physical sciences the method of approach was empirical, secular, descriptive, analytical;
ethics and philosophy were avoided as presumably subjective and "unscientific."
So in 1927 we find a leading political scientist insisting
that "it is no more the function of the political scientist
to evaluate the good or bad consequences of particular
techniques than it is the function of the chemist, qua
chemist, to pass ethical judgments upon the use which
other men make of chemical knowledge and skill." And
in the same year the president of the American Political
Science Association in his presidential address said: "Political science, to become a science, shotild first of all
obtain a divorce from the philosophers, the lawyers and
the psychologists with whom it has long been in the status
of a polygamous companionate marriage to the detriment
of its own quest for truth.... Our immediate goal, there-
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fore, should be to release political science from the old
metaphysical and juristic concepts upon which it has traditionally been based. . . . It is to the natural sciences
that we may most profitably turn, in this hour of transition, for suggestions as to our postulates and methods.
Political science should borrow by analogy from the new
physics a determinatipn to get rid of intellectual insincerities concerning the nature of sovereignty, the general will,
natural rights, and the freedom of the individual, the consent of the governed, majority rule, home rule, the rule of
public opinion, state rights, laissez-faire, checks and balances, the equality of men and nations, and a government
of laws not men."
And today, though not without some challenge, we find
such statements as these by leading political scientists:
"It is not the function of the scientist to judge between
'good' and 'evil' in his research operations. It is not up
to him to say that political corruption is either good or
bad." And "It is certainly not appropriate in the classroom, particularly at the college level, to discuss political
ideologies in terms of 'better or worse.' " In political science as in other social sciences there are many relativists
who contend that there is no scientific method of determining the superiority of one end over another. As Arnold
Brecht has put it: "There is according to relativism no
scientific method by which to state, in non-relative terms,
whether man has a specific dignity that ought always to
be respected ... whether there is a greater value in peace
or in war, in charity or selfishness, in the liberation of
slaves or the enslavement of the free, in the goals of de-
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mocracy or fascism. Most relativists have insisted that
value judgments are statements not of what is but what
ought to be, and that it is not possible logically to derive
a statement of what ought to be from a statement of what
is. Some have gone so far as to say that sentences dealing
with what ought to be are no statements at all, but merely
express emotional preferences, sentiments regarding one's
own behavior, or the like."
The shift from ethical or moral emphasis to positivistic
description and the development of political science as a
separate discipline was paralleled in the field of economics. It too was originally a part of moral philosophy, but
by 1825 many colleges were giving courses in "political
economy." Towards the end of the century less and less
attention was paid to problems of government and much
more to problems of private business and later departments of economics were developing into Schools of Business Administration. Though a relation was recognized
between economics and political science, psychology and
history, there was little to philosophy and none to ethics.
For thought was concentrated on the standardized, mythical economic man whose sole motivation was the pursuit
of profit in complete isolation from obligation to others
or to society at large and without regard to conscience or
moral principle. And so far as national economy was concerned the sole problem was how to strengthen the state
for its own selfish purposes of imperialism or of power.
For the economist like the "scientific" political scientist
placed no limits of morality or of natural or higher law
upon the sovereign state. And the teacher of economics
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like the political scientist used the descriptive method; he
excluded any standard but profit or material prosperity;
effected by the evolutionary hypothesis and by changes in
institutions and in economic practices revealed by the historian he often doubted the existence of any economic
laws that were more than tentative assertions of the probable. As Harold G. Moulton of the Brookings Institute
puts it: "A phrase-the relativity of economic thoughthas been developed to indicate the necessity of an evolutionary body of economic thought paralleling evolutionary changes in the economic system."
Evolutionary theory, particularly the struggle for existence, dominated the thought of teachers of economics
generally in the United States during the exploitive period of business expansion that followed the civil war. It
was especially congenial to the individualistic entrepreneur. John D. Rockefeller in a Sunday-school address
said: "The growth of a large business is merely the survival of the fittest... . The American Beauty rose can be
produced in the splendor and fragrance which bring
cheer to its beholder only by sacrificing the early buds
which grow up around it. This is not an evil tendency in
business. It is merely the working out of a law of nature
and a law of God." Rockefeller was merely expressing a
generally-held opinion widely popularized through the
immense sales of Herbert Spencer's books which reached
their greatest influence about the early eighties. William
Graham Sumner with a "wider following than any other
teacher in Yale's history," provided his age with a "synthesis of the protestant ethic," of success as the reward of
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virtue, the laissez-faire doctrines of classical economics,
and a combination of Ricardian principles of inevitability
with evolutionary scientific determinism. Rights, according to Sumner were simply evolving folkways, not representative of absolute antecedent principles but merely
currently adopted rules of the competitive game.
The close relation between Darwinism and pragmatism
was paralleled among economists. It was one of their
leaders, Thomas Nixon Carver, who preached the doctrine, in a book The Religion Worth Having, that "the
naturally selected are the chosen of God," and that the
best religion is that which "acts most powerfully as a spur
to energy and directs that energy most productively."
It was not strange that sociology, deriving its name and
the inspiration for its separate discipline from the founder
of positivism should, under Spencer's leadership, consider
society in evolutionary biological terms. If the life of society, progress upward and onward, did not depend upon
the ruthless struggle of individuals subject only to the
jungle law of nature red in tooth and claw, it was
the struggle of groups: biological, round-headed, longheaded, supposedly racial. And later, sociology like all
the social sciences was profoundly influenced by the development of modem psychology, particularly crowd psychology. But before we come to that let us briefly
consider history and anthropology.
In 1834 the first volume of German-trained George
Bancroft's History of the United States with its prefatory
emphasis upon indefatigable research, reliance upon primary sources alone, skeptical insistence upon authenticity,
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foreshadowed the era of later nineteenth century American history. In that period, under the influence of German scholarship and imported seminar methods, the
panoramic literary histories of Prescott, Motley and Parkman were replaced by a constantly increasing flood of
highly specialized, monographic studies where generalizations were scrupulously avoided in preference for detailed specific facts. Anything savoring of a philosophy
of history was anathema, and in the interest of objective
scientific truth thought and expression were carefully immunized against any contamination by ethical or moral
judgments. There were no such things as laws of history,
synthesis was rare and even the emotional appeal of a
literary style was viewed with suspicion as indicating subjectivity or bias. Aridity proved validity. Cultural histories stressed the constant change in institutions and in
concepts. Economic determinism reenforced by the
spread of Marxism emphasized the non-rational, selfinterest class struggle aspects of the human story. It is
not without significance, as Eliot has pointed out, that
Beard in his Economic Interpretationof the Constitution
of the United States quoted Pascal: "The will, the imagination, the disorders of the body, the thousand concealed
infirmities of the intelligence conspire to reduce our discovery of justice and truth to a process of haphazard in
which we more often miss than hit the mark." So Bryce
wrote: "As regards large parts of every public that may
be said which the old statesman said to his son in Disraeli's Contarini Fleming, 'Few ideas are correct ones,
and what are correct no one can ascertain'."

THE NATURAL

LAW AND

PRAGMATISM

As to anthropology, the study of man as a social being
was inevitably revolutionized by the evolutionary hypothesis. The theory that man evolved from the anthropoid
ape emphasized his kinship with the animal world from
which he had been separated ever since the days of Aristotle as a uniquely rational being. It gave great impetus
to the study of animals in both their individual and associated activities: how insects, birds, and mammals build
shelters, store foocd; ants cultivate fungi; apes use sticks
and stones as tools; division of labor, property rights asserted by individuals and by animal societies; mutual aid
as a factor in evolution; primitive cultures; changes in
environment as changing customs and beliefs; ethical
systems and religions as products of their age and as developments of primitive myths, superstitions and customs,
tribal rituals, fetishes, tabus, animism. Here were flux,
interminable change, absence of eternal verities and enduring standards, individual animal instincts and desires
and the will of the tribe institutionalizeed and rationalized. But with the mask snatched off by the "scientific"
anthropologist man individually and collectively was inescapably neanderthal or piltdown, indeed brother to
the ox.
We cannot linger on psychology which became increasingly biological, experimental, materialistic, functional,
non-philosophical, behavioristic, Freudian, anti-intellectualist. Just as Darwinism lent itself admirably to facile
picturesque popularization, so the new psychology was
widely publicised to the masses who soon glibly attributed
the conduct of man whether prize-fighter or supreme
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court justice, not to principles or reason, but to external
stimuli, visceral reactions, complexes, suppressed desires,
long-forgotten infantile frustrations. Social psychology,
although coming into recognition as a distinct social science in the last decade of the nineteenth century had its
roots as far back as Protagoras with his insistence upon
public opinion rather than natural law as determining
what men consider right. Bagehot's Physics and Politics
anticipated Tarde, Le Bon and at the turn of the century,
E. A. Ross. More and more individual thought was regarded as the product of stimuli arising from social or
collective situations; from the pressure of mob emotion,
of changing and irrational mass opinions. Graham Wallas's Human Nature in Politics, published in 1908 had
wide influence with his warning: "Away with the intellectualist fallacy; politics is only in a slight degree the
product of conscious reason; it is largely a matter of subconscious processes of habit and instinct, suggestion and
imitation .... Man, like other animals, lives in an unending stream of sense impressions."
James Harvey Robinson's The Mind in the Making
appeared in 1921 and had a wide popular appeal. Who
can calculate the effects of such statements as these made
with all the eclat of modern scientific truth: "Our convictions on important matters are not the result of knowledge or of critical thought.... They are whisperings of
'the voice of the herd.' . . . No . . .mind, exempt from

bodily processes, animal impulses, savage traditions, infantile impressions, conventional reactions, and traditional knowledge ever existed.... The progress of mankind
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in the scientific knowledge and regulation of human affairs has remained almost stationary for over two thousand years ....

And how, indeed, as descendants of an

extinct race of primates, with a mind still in the early
stages of accumulation, should we be in the way of reaching ultimate truth at any point? ...

I am inclined to rate

metaphysics, like smoking, as a highly gratifying indulgence to those who like it, and, as indulgences go, relatively innocent ....

Plato ascribed the highest form of

existence to ideals and abstractions. This was a new and
sophisticated republication of savage animism. .

.

. The

modem 'principle' is too often only a new form of the
ancient taboo ....

The reliance on authority is a funda-

mental primitive trait.... We are still animals with not
only an animal body, but an animal mind. The sharp
distinction between the mind and the body is

. .

. a very

ancient and spontaneous uncritical savage prepossession.
...

Language is not primarily a vehicle of ideas and in-

formation, but an emotional outlet, corresponding to various cooings, growlings, snarls, crowings, and brayings."
But perhaps the greatest breach in the wall of human
faith in reason was made by the widespread promulgation by Robinson and others of the doctrine of rationalization, derived according to Dewey from the abnormal
psychology of the insane. Here as in other instances a
valid caution was carried to exaggeration inconsistent
with truth. Said Robinson: "Most of our so-called reasoning consists in finding arguments for going on believing
The 'real' reasons for our beliefs
as we already do ....
are concealed from ourselves as well as from others. . ..
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We unconsciously absorb them from our environment....
Our 'good' reasons are at bottom the result of personal
preference or prejudice. Rationalizing is the self-exculpation which occurs when we feel ourselves or our group
accused of misapprehension or error. And now the astonishing and perturbing suspicion emerges that perhaps
almost all that has passed for social science, political economy, politics and ethics in the past may be brushed aside
by future generations as mainly rationalizing. John Dewey
has already reached this conclusion as to philosophy. So
the social sciences have continued even to our own day to
be rationalizations of uncritically accepted beliefs and
customs." Falling in the backwash of cynicism that followed World War I, contributing to and coinciding with
a wave of debunking biographies and an era of critical
realism, often utter and gutter, in literature and the arts
and on the stage, a revolt against standards and a reversion to the unintelligible, animalistic yawp of the primitive and the jungle; this too furthered the attack on
reason.
The philosophy of the schools was also influenced by
modem psychology, anthropology, history, particularly
cultural history, comparative political science and comparative ethics. Without depreciating the hard thinking
and sincerity of teachers of secular philosophy in general,
I content myself with adopting the phrase that philosophy courses are often a species of kaleidoscopic entertainment leading only to confusion. Indeed in one great
American university the announced purpose of a textbook
in modem philosophy was to leave the reader or student
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in a state of profound confusion. As Father G. Stuart
Hogan has said: "In modem secular education, philosophy, if taught at all, assumes the form of an exposition or
history of the various systems of philosophic thought, ancient and modem, rather than a scientific attempt to
determine philosophic truth, or to establish a true philosophic-religious system of thought. In most of our secular
institutions of higher learning philosophy has become a
rather unimportant elective subject. To many college
graduates, or even college professors ... at most

. .

it is

a study of man's opinions and conflicting views (most of
which are not worth the paper they are written on)."
Turning from philosophy to legal education we find
that down to the end of the civil war courses in departments or schools of law generally had the Blackstonian
ideal of educating the gentleman rather than giving specifically vocational training for the lawyer. But with the
increasing flood of judicial decisions there was a shift
from lectures on the law of nature and of nations and
philosophically jurisprudential subjects to technical analytical studies of specifically American law. Ideas of
specialization, of concentrating on facts with scientific
objectivity as in the social sciences to the avoidance of the
philosophical and the ethical came to dominate legal education in America. The great turning point was, of
course, the institution of the case system by Langdell at
Harvard in 1870. It was based on the assumption that
the law could be taught inductively. For a long period in
American law schools it was used without any reference
to philosophy, administered to students often without
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philosophical training or education in general ideas, dominated by the conceptions of a mechanistic Austinian
jurisprudence according to which positive law was a selfsufficient science having no relation to the social sciences,
utterly divorced from ethics and from natural law. The
problem for many years was merely to find out what the
law was; sole concern was with the "is," none, at least
systematically, with the "ought." The curriculum and
spirit of legal education were intensely practical; teacher
and student concentrated, as James would say, on the
"cash value" of ideas, not on theories or abstractions.
Courses of no immediate use to the private practitioner
such as legal history, comparative law, Roman or civil
law and legal philosophy generally disappeared, or here
and there anemically survived as electives-relegated to
the cellar or the closet along with legal ethics. And that
subject generally consisted merely of a hasty deferential
bow to Sharswood or bar association canons of ethics that
were courtesies of the trade rather than principles with
any solid philosophical or reasoned ethical basis.
Thus the whole sweep of thought in political science,
economics, sociology, anthropology, history, psychology,
philosophy, and in legal education during the last hundred years was in the direction of relativism, positivism,
empiricism, concentration on concrete measurable facts
and the analysis of narrowly circumscribed situations by
specialists using their own highly specialized techniques.
The emphasis was on change rather than stability, on the
temporal and immediate rather than the eternal, on the
natural to the exclusion of the supernatural. There was
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distrust of synthesis and of metaphysics, disregard of ontology, suspicion of philosophy.
To the relativity of the social sciences was added a confusion resulting from profound changes in the physical
sciences during the latter part of the last one hundred
years. These changes were particularly disturbing to
those who had turned from religion to dogmatic materialistic science as their god or had hoped that an integrated philosophy would emerge from facts produced by
the inductive sciences as soon as there were facts enough.
It was seen that the physical sciences had their own basic
assumptions, previously unchallenged. The solid matter
of Newtonian physics was replaced by something wavelike. "Fixed measures, constant rules became ambiguous.
Bodies could be of two sizes at the same time, straight
lines contemporaneously crooked." It was discovered
that "the assumptions of classical physics were not universal necessities of nature, but only somewhat parochial
principles of analysis suitable for handling a limited type
of material." Causality was doubted. Whitehead said:
"The stable foundations of physics have broken up. ...
The old foundations of scientific thought are becoming
unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether, function, electricity, mechanism, organism, configuration,
structure, pattern, all require reinterpretation." There
was reason for Dewey saying: "If reality itself be in transition... this doctrine originated not with the objectionable pragmatist, but with the physicist and naturalist and
moral historian."
Thus it is certain that the whole climate of opinion,
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both educational and popular, was favorable to the seeds
of pragmatism.
We recognize, of course, that the roots of pragmatism
go back to the Sophists. We recognize the fact that the
temper of thought in the United States was akin to that
which dominated European thought during the last century and that pragmatism is not an exclusively American
invention flowering only on American soil. Nevertheless
pragmatism made a particularly strong appeal to the
American mind. As de Tocqueville said: "To evade the
bondage of system and habit, of family-maxims, class
opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to
accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise
and doing better; to seek the reason of things for one's
self, and in one's self alone; to tend to results without
being bound to means, and to aim at the substance
through the form ;-such are the principal characteristics
of what I shall call the philosophical methods of the
Americans."
Pragmatism was practical. So was the American. Like
the frontiersman and the man of business it tended
to scorn theory; there was condemnation in the word
"theoretical." Both glorified action at the expense of
reflection; efficiency was their god. Both emphasized
short-term visible, tangible results rather than long-term
eventualities, distrusted the abstract, preferred concrete
and definite facts that could be weighed, measured,
counted, and banked; looked to the future rather than
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the past. As de Tocqueville noted in his diary: "There is
no country in the world where man more confidently
seizes the future." Or as Bliss Perry put it: "Here in
America everything was to do; we were forced to conjugate our verbs in the future tense." So too the logic of
both looked to consequences rather than to premises.
They were of the "restless temper" that the Frenchman
also noted. "The American,"he said, "has no time to tie
himself to anything, he grows accustomed only to change,
and ends by regarding it as the natural state of man. He
feels the need of it, more, he loves it; for the instability,
instead of meaning disaster to him seems to give birth
only to miracles about him." Both pragmatism and the
American were ex tempore, particularly valued the expedient, were generally inclined to regard differences of
principle as merely verbal and of no great consequence
unless something momentous was visibly at stake, distrustful of what they called dogma. Both pragmatism
and the American were individualistic, anti-authoritarian, proud of the right of private judgment, equalitarian
in that one man's opinion was as good as another's. Both
were materialistic, prided themselves on what they called
their tough, hard realism but nevertheless were sentimental and often idealistic-provided that the ideals were
sufficiently vague.
Rousseau and romanticism are seen in both. The ineradicable moral sentiments of man, vestigial remnants
of transcendentalism, secularized protestantism and humanitarian impulses derived from the Christian ethic
and impelling even those avowedly agnostic, skeptic or
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materialist, were capitalized and canalized into the support of secular education. By concentrating on pedagogical methods and on material equipment, on means and
organizations, the divisive effect of any conscious or unconscious disagreement as to the essential nature of man
and the ultimate end of the educational process was
avoided. As religious faith weakened and dogmatic science of the late nineteenth century was seen to be a false
god, more and more earnest men and women made public
education their non-sectarian, non-credal, intensely practical and tangible religion. As a leading pragmatist said,
the teacher's desk became an altar. And John Dewey
was the prophet of the new religion which was fused into
a worship of democracy that rapidly won adherents.
Ethics and -truth were man-made, instruments of an anthropological humanism, expressions of the general will
in which each man mystically participated. As Kallen
says: "For Dewey growth is intelligence, intelligence is
freedom, freedom is education, education is growth." Education plus government of a socialistic type would enable
men to work together with a sense of unity and to achieve
their ideals. The ideals, however, were not stated any
more than the objective of the "growth" which was education. The big thing was shared experience and "this
active relation between the ideal and the actual" to which
Dewey gave the name "God." God, he said, is simply
"the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and
actions."
In 1888 Dewey had written: "Democracy and the one,
the ultimate ethical ideal of humanity are to my mind
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synonymous. The idea of democracy, the ideas of liberty,
equality, and fraternity, represent a society in which the
distinction between the spiritual and the secular has
ceased ... the church and the state, the divine and the
human organization of society are one." Forty-six years
later he defined religious faith, not as belief in a supernatural deity nor in values transcending human life, but
as "the unification of self through allegiance to inclusive
ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which
the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices." Evidently the 'inclusive ideal ends"
whatever they might from time to time turn out transiently to be, were to be determined or sought for in a
democratic educational system whose only philosophyif it be a philosophy-was to be pragmatism. And the
pragmatism was to be democratic in a democracy in
which, according to Dewey, "the governed and the governors are not two classes, but two aspects of the same
fact-the fact of the possession by society of a unified and
articulate will."
Here once again is the sovereign general will of Rousseau, sentimental, anti-intellectual, making its own standards to suit the desires of the transient hour, taking
expediency as its guide, restrained by no objective standards or by recognition of any higher law than force and
the will to power. Certainly to the pragmatist there was
to be no restraint of natural law.
And here at the last I mention natural law. But I have
done this purposely. For I need not point out how difficult it would be for natural law with its basis in absolutes,
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in reason, in eternal unchanging verities, to withstand the
erosion of this philosophical and cultural environment.
What interest could there be in scholastic natural law, in
true natural law, among a generation of materialists as
Carleton Hayes called the men of 1870 to 1900, men of a
sensate culture as Sorokin described those of this age,
among men contemptuous of tradition whose scorn of the
medieval was matched only by their ignorance of the
accomplishments of the medieval mind? They were
repelled also from what they thought was natural law by
two brands of pseudo-natural law. First, that represented
by the excessively theoretical and abstract creations of the
French revolutionary mind with its succession of paper
constitutions echoed by the closet-spun codes of Bentham.
Second, the Spencerian identification of natural law with
the brute struggle for existence and individualistic, atomistic laissez-faire. Indeed it was the humanitarian revulsion at abuses of the capitalistic system run riot and
proletarian protest that brought into being the progressive movement of the first part of this century. Pragmatism was a powerful weapon against the status quo and
it is not without significance that so many leaders of the
movement were pragmatists. More and more they called
upon the state for aid; for control of economic processes,
often without too much thought as to the dangers of a
totalitarian trend. This was the paradox of liberalism.
Liberalism in the law had certain salutary effects which
no one of sense would deny any more than he would assert that all of pragmatism was evil. But the evil effects
of pragmatism and its offspring legal realism were clear:
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the introduction of what to many was regarded as an
unwise and unnecessary disregard of stare decisi and too
wide a degree of judicial discretion, indeed the conversion of the judge too often into a legislator in constitutional cases. But most dangerous of all was the unsettling of
the philosophical bases of the law. These evil effects I
know you know because of the clear and trenchant criticisms of legal pragmatism by such scholastics as Francis
Lucey, S.J., John C. Ford, S.J., William H. Kenealy, S.J.,
R. W. Mulligan, S.J., Msgr. William Dillon, Clarence
Manion, Brendan F. Brown, the late Walter Kennedy,
and Miriam Theresa Rooney. Nor shall I here discuss
the profound influence of Mr. Justice Holmes because of
his skillful use of his long-occupied key position on the
Supreme Court, because of his intellectual power, the
prestige of his name, and the felicities of a style sufficient
to deceive even the elect. So also I shall not pause here
to refer to some return of philosophy to the law schools,
the growing discontent with pragmatic secular education,
with a science that has created a Frankenstein monster
which threatens to destroy us and which gives us neither
assurance, nor hope, nor wisdom. But if anything is becoming clear to this confused revolutionary generation
when the foundations of civilization are shaken to the
depths, it is that the law like life needs an integrating philosophy that will give some objective standards, some sure
footing amidst the shifting sands of crumbling secular
institutions.
You and I know that the answer lies in the further invigoration and wider acceptance of scholastic natural
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law; that natural law which represents the experienced
reason of men of many races, tongues and cultures since
far before the birth of Christ; that natural law whose
achievements for fifteen centuries the Carlyles have
traced, to which Coke and our revolutionary forefathers
appealed, and which for the Founding Fathers was the
one sure basis of constitutional liberty in America, indeed
in any land at that time.
One hundred and forty million men and women, each
unique and infinitely precious in the eyes of God, seek
refuge in the temple of American law. They look for protection against the abuses of arbitrary power whether by
individuals, ruthless minority groups, or by the clamorous
majority in a vast continental democracy. If they find
that the foundations of that structure have been subtly
undermined so that it no longer gives them assurance of
protection; if they see with newly-opened eyes that the
law administered therein is merely the embodiment of
arbitrary force, of command and not of reason or enduring principles of justice, they will shatter it to bits and
revert to primeval chaos or insurrection organized. And
that catastrophe will occur if a pragmatic philosophy
dominates the law, particularly American constitutional
law. For, the basic philosophy of the Constitution gone,
only an empty shell of verbiage remains. That discovered, the public opinion which supports the law, the Constitution and the courts, will turn against them for their
mockery of justice and seek other gods-perhaps the gods
of force.
Ben W. Palmer

THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAW
IN PHILOSOPHY
I

T

HE general purpose of this essay is to discover what
is common to the acceptance of natural law in all
epochs of European history, despite diversity of doctrine
on other related points. It seems that many agree about
natural law, though they disagree about related metaphysical and theological principles. Because of such disagreement, the agreement may not go very deep; yet it
is worth examining in order to determine the line which
divides those who accept and those who reject natural
law.
Most of the writers to be mentioned do not accept what
is perhaps the most exhaustive and most analytical treatment of natural law. Many of them do not know, and
those who know do not accept, St. Thomas's whole theory
of law, especially in its basic presuppositions; but, nevertheless, there are certain minimum points of agreement
between Aquinas and these others about natural law.
There are two general approaches to any philosophical
controversy. You can ask which men uphold and which
men oppose a certain conclusion; and thus you can determine the opposition of minds on the issue. But if you ask
of those who stand on one side of the issue, what are their
definitions and analyses, their reasons and demonstrations,
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you will discover those you thought in agreement parting
company.
The maximum agreement among philosophers is found
when you consider only their conclusions. The maximum
disagreement, or at least diversity, appears when you consider their reasoning or analysis.
Looked at in the second way, none of the great philosophers ever completely agrees with any other on natural
law. Aristotle, for example, tends to disagree with St.
Thomas in many details. Yet if you look only to the main
point, you can place them side by side as exponents of a
doctrine which can loosely be called a "doctrine of natural law."
I should like to begin, therefore, with finding the shared
truth and by trying to say precisely what that shared
truth is, even though it will be manifest, when the truth
is analyzed and the reasons for it are examined, that the
philosophers who are thus associated in agreement, do not
agree throughout or deeply.
Let me list the philosophers who, it seems to me, for
one reason or another, affirm natural law. They are
Plato and Aristotle, St. Thomas, Locke, Rousseau, Kant,
and, with a little hesitation, I would even add Hobbes
and Spinoza. This is not an exhaustive list, but it is a list
which includes the widest diversity of philosophical opinion. I have listed only the truly great-the capital
writers. I have not bothered to name followers and commentators, of which, as in the case of St. Thomas especially, there are so many who add so little.
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II

Let me begin, then, by stating what all these minds
hold in common concerning natural law. Let me try thus
to state the issue between them as naturalists and the
positivists on the other side. I shall call a "naturalist" in
law the man who thinks there is something other and
more than positive law, a "positivist" the man who thinks
that there is only positive law and that there are no rational grounds for the criticism of positive law.
What do all those whom I call "naturalists" agree on?
What do they affiirm? I must point out at once that they
do not all use the words "natural law"; nor do they all
have the same concept of natural law. But this they do
hold in common: the laws made by a state or government
are not the only directions of conduct which apply to men
living in society.
They affirm that, in addition to such rules as each individual may make for himself, and in addition to the rules
of conduct the state may lay down, there are rules or principles of conduct which are of even greater universalityapplying to all men, not merely to one man, and not merely even to one society at a given time and place.
They affirm, furthermore, that there are rules of human
conduct which no man has invented-which are not positive in the sense of being posited! (Subsequently, I shall
try to show that the real meaning of positivism involves,
as St. Thomas points out, the notion of the arbitrary, an
institution of the will as opposed to something natural,
discovered by the intellect.)
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They agree that man's reason is endowed with the
capacity of perceiving these universal laws or principles
of conduct, and that, if they are recognized as being laws
of reason or rational principles, these laws need no other
foundation or authority than the recognition of their
truth.
They agree in affirming that these principles are somehow the source of all the more particular rules of conduct,
even those which individuals make for themselves or those
which governments make in political societies and seek
to maintain by force; and they agree that these principles
constitute the standard by which all other rules are to be
judged good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust, and in
terms of which constitutions and governments are similarly to be judged.
With respect to all these points, I have no hesitation in
claiming unanimity on the part of the philosophers
named, with the possible exception of Hobbes and Spinoza. The latter stand on the very edge of the line which divides the naturalists from the positivists; or perhaps they
can be said to be in a borderline area in which the two
doctrines tend to be inconsistently fused and the whole
controversy thereby confused.
III
Let us now consider the different ways in which the
shared conclusion about natural law is affirmed. I shall
not try to make this survey exhaustive. Let us begin with
the Greeks.
So far as either word or concept is concerned, there is
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no doctrine of natural law in the philosophy of Plato and
Aristotle. The very phrase "natural law" would be an
impossible collocation of words in Greek, because the
meaning of the Greek word for law connotes the conventional-the very opposite of the natural. The Greek
equivalent for "natural law" is "universal" or "common"
law, not "common law" in the sense of our AngloAmerican tradition, but common in the sense of belonging to all particular codes of law. The Greeks perceived
that each state or society of the ancient world had its own
particular body of conventions or laws; yet there was
something common to all of them.
The principles or precepts common to all, they regarded as the common or universal law. Aristotle, for
example, therefore distinguished between natural and
legal (or conventional) justice-never between natural
and legal law.
Let me quote Aristotle. "Of political justice part is
natural, part legal-natural, that which everywhere has
the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this
or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but
when it has been laid down is not indifferent." If what
Aristotle meant by "natural justice" were to be expressed
in a set of propositions or principles, practical in character, such propositions would very closely resemble the
precepts later called, in the middle ages, the principles of
natural law. They might not include what Aquinas treats
as the first principle of natural law, but they would probably retain many of the propositions which St. Thomas
calls the secondary precepts, such as, thou shalt not kill,
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thou shalt not steal, and thou shalt not commit adultery.
These principles of natural justice, moreover, function as
natural law does. Natural justice for Aristotle measures
the justice of constitutions and the justice of laws-the
legal justice which corresponds to the justice in positive
law.
Natural justice leaves many things undetermined which
must be determined by the conventions of political or civil
law. These are the things which Aristotle says cease to
be indifferent only after the state has enacted them into
law. In Aristotle's doctrine of equity, natural or absolute
justice calls for the correction of legal or conventional justice, i.e., of the written or positive law, wherein, by reason
of its generality, it is unjust in the particular case. This
demonstrates the relation between natural and legal justice, not natural and positive law, although, of course,
there is an obvious parallel between the two.
Is there anything lacking in Aristotle's doctrine at this
point? It might be said that natural justice, even if it
were the equivalent of natural law, is not as extensive,
because the sphere of justice is limited to man's relation
to other men and to society. It does not cover those problems in human conduct which are not social. Yet, even
if natural justice deals only with man's social conduct,
Aristotle makes one point which suggests the first principle of natural law. It occurs where Aristotle speaks of
the final end as the first principle in ethics, and makes it
perfectly clear that all sound, practical thinking about the
means depends on reason's perception of the end. Without any of the language or apparatus of later natural law
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doctrine, this is not very dissimilar from theories which
speak of the first principle of practical reason as a principle directing conduct to its ultimate end. This principle
is expressed in the words "Seek the Good."'
Let us turn next to the Stoics, and to the philosophy of
Marcus Aurelius, for example. Here we have a kind of
pantheism, in which an indwelling reason is nature's divinity. Throughout Stoic thought, this indwelling reason
is looked upon as the principle or standard of human conduct, which is measured by its conformity to nature or,
what is the same, rationality. In the context of these
Stoic ideas, there arises in Roman jurisprudence a distinction, not merely between the written and the unwritten
law, but between that which is right for all men everywhere because it is based on nature, and that which is
right only after it has been legally instituted by particular
states or governments.
I am not an etymologist and I know very little about
languages, but I feel that if the translation of the word
"ius" had always been "right" and not "law," and if the
Latin word "lex" had always carried the same meaning
as the Greek word "nomos," then much of the control Until men properly conceive their happiness, they have not found the
first principle which determines all other moral decisions. The familiar
statement of the first principle of natural law does not distinguish between
the real and the apparent good. The good unqualified could be either or
both. If one were to say "Seek the good, real or apparent," there would be
no practical meaning to the proposition, because one cannot avoid seeking
the good, real or apparent. What on-- seeks is always either the real or
the apparent good, and a law to be truly a moral law must be one that
can be violated or transgressed. Hence, the only thing which can be a
direction to a free will is a proposition of this sort: Seek the real good
and the whole good, not any part of it alone. That rule of action can be
violated every day, and probably is.
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versy about "natural law" would never have taken place.
No one would have misunderstood the distinction between
a right by nature and a right by political institution. It
is due to the Stoics, I think, that "ius naturale" and "ius
civile" later came to be spoken of, not as two kinds of
right, but as two kinds of law-naturaland civil law.
In consequence, we have both distinctions side by side:
natural and civil or positive law; natural and positive
right. This is a cause of great confusion in all subsequent
thinking. In the Stoic philosophy we also find a notion
which does not appear in Greek thought, namely, that
everything which has a nature is governed by natural law,
for in every nature there dwells rationality.
In St. Thomas, we cannot help but perceive a confluence of Greek and Stoic doctrines. I wish to call attention to a few points in St. Thomas's theory of natural law
which have a bearing on the major issue. The natural
law is not made by man, but discovered by him. If the
principles of the natural law are self-evident, and the
conclusions which can be drawn from it are strictly deducible, then the natural law can be promulgated by
teaching in the same way that geometry is. The natural
law is binding in conscience, not by the coercion of external force. It is broader in scope than all of positive law
since it is concerned with everything that belongs to man's
happiness, not merely with the welfare of the state or society, which is only a part of man's happiness.
John Locke, through the benefit of Hooker's influence
upon him, writes in the tradition of Aquinas. For him,
natural right is the standard for judging all civil laws and
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the basis for rebelling against or disobeying those state
regulations which violate natural law. Locke gives no
analysis of the primary and secondary precepts of natural
law. But though he may differ very radically from Aristotle and Aquinas on basic philosophical questions, Locke
affirms a standard for positive law comparable to Aristotle's natural justice, and he conceives the natural law as
the law of reason. Much the same kind of thing can be
said about Rousseau in relation to the tradition.
On the other hand, Kant speaks a different language.
He speaks of innate as opposed to acquired right, and of
private as contrasted with public right, and he talks in
terms of rules of conduct which belong to the pure practical reason. Yet he is fundamentally affirming what
others mean by natural law, for he is here treating those
principles of conduct which are discovered by reason
quite apart from convention or experience-rules not
made by the state, rules which are the measure of right in
all the laws of the state.
If, however, we turn from Kant to Hobbes, we find
that the latter flatly denies there is any justice or injustice apart from the constituted commonwealth. He denies, therefore, that there is any standard of law prior
to the existence of a sovereign power. Until the sovereign makes laws, no man can say what is just and unjust.
That being so, no one can say that the sovereign is just or
unjust because the laws he m'ikes are the standard of justice. This appears to be legal positivism.
Nevertheless, Hobbes affirms natural law to be the law
of reason. This natural law directs men to quit the state
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of nature for their good and security and to form a commonwealth. It requires them to keep the covenants they
make. Yet when Hobbes talks about this law of nature,
which is the law of reason, he makes the point that it is
not law but counsel or advice.
IV
Omitting the borderline case of Hobbes, I have tried to
show that a certain degree of agreement exists concerning natural law. I would now like to show what that
agreement comes to in its most general terms.
It consists in the affirmation that there exist moral and
political truths which men can discover by their reason.
These truths have the status of knowledge rather than
mere opinion. They are either self-evident or they can
be demonstrated. In short, whether or not a writer uses
the phrase "natural law," whether he has one or another
theory of it, he stands against positivism if he affirms that
human conduct, and moral decisions in the sphere of private or public action, can be based on knowledge of right
and wrong, good and evil, or on a knowledge of what end
should be sought by all men (the first principle) and what
means are necessarily indispensable (the secondary precepts).
Accordingly it is easy to summarize the view taken on
the other side of the issue. It consists in the denial of such
practical truths or knowledge. It consists positively in
saying that all moral judgments are matters of opinion,
that there is nothing in human nature or reason which
determines what men should seek or how to seek it. The
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only resolution of political disputes is by appeal to force,
the force of numbers or of arms.
One other point to be learned from our brief survey of
the agreement about natural law is the cause of confusion
in the discussion of natural law.
Hobbes is the man who illustrates this point best. Why
does he deny that what he calls "natural law" is really
law in the strict sense? The answer is, of course, that he
has a definition of law which necessarily excludes "natural law." Is he wrong in this? No, I do not think he is
at all wrong-certainly not as a philosopher.
If, for example, he were a positivist in the complete
sense of the skeptic who says that there are no moral or
political truths, then he would be wrong. But that he
does not say. Hobbes may be wrong in his political theory. He may be wrong in his metaphysics. But he is not
wrong if he thinks that naturaland civil laws are not laws
in the same sense, and if he denies that the same definition
can be applied to both.
Why is this point worth mentioning? One reason is that
there are two sorts of opponents of natural law: the skeptics who deny universal validity to any moral or political
principle; and those who are not skeptical, who admit
that there are such truths, but find a stumbling block in
the use of the phrase "natural law." Many good lawyers
belong to this latter group. Many of our law schools face
this difficulty with natural law because they fail to recognize that the word "law" when used in the phrases "natural law" and "positive law" is being used equivocally, not
univocally.
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I shall devote the remainder of this address to amplifying the last point made with reference to Hobbes. I
shall try to substantiate it by reference to St. Thomas's
analysis of natural law. If we examine St. Thomas's discussion of the definition of law, we shall find that it applies only to positive law, and that natural law is law
only in the manner of speaking.
V
Let us begin with St. Thomas's definition of law as an
ordinance of reason, for the common good, promulgated
by him who has charge of the community. Obviously,
these words need explanation, and where St. Thomas
answers objections to the parts of the definition, such
explanation is given.
He says that all law proceeds from both the reason and
the will of the lawgiver.
In explaining the phrase "for the common good," St.
Thomas admits that two quite distinct meanings are intended-happiness or beatitude, and the good of the body
politic. Both are ends, but the latter is not an end simpliciter. Both are common goods, but they are not common in the same sense.
St. Thomas also says that "without coercive power, a
rule is only advice or counsel," and not law. He adds
that coercive power is vested either in the whole people or
in some public personage.
If you combine the note of coercion with the notion
that only the whole people or their vicegerent have the
authority to make laws, it immediately indicates which
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meaning of the common good is involved in the definition
of law, viz., the political common good, the good of the
community, not happiness or beatitude.
Furthermore, ask yourself these questions. Why should
not any man be competent to make law? Why should not
any man's ordinance of reason have the authority of law?
If law is simply an ordinance of reason, one man's reason,
if sound, is as good as another's; and one man's reason, if
sound, is much better than the reason of the whole people, if that reason should be unsound. Why does the
source of law have to be the whole community, if law is
nothing but an ordinance of reason? No answer can be
given to these questions, unless we remember the factor
of will which enters into the definition of law as well as
the factor of reason.
How does the law proceed from the will of the lawgiver? The answer is that in the kind of law which is
made by the whole community or its vicegerent-namely,
positive law-the making of law consists in a voluntary
choice among diverse ordinances proposed by reason.
The ordinances of positive law are derivable from the
principles of practical reason. They are, as St. Thomas
says, determinations of, not deductions from, these principles. Each determination involves that which, prior to
legal determination, was indifferent-neither naturally
just nor unjust. The lawmaker, therefore, can freely
choose between alternative formulations of a rule of law
-the alternatives being in most cases equally just though
perhaps not equally expedient.
Rules of positive law are strictly opinion. I am using
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the word "opinion," in the strict sense, as applied to propositions to which the intellect assents only when it is
moved to assent by the will. Rules of law or positive laws
are, as opinion, arbitrary,that is, voluntarily adopted. If
rules of positive law were not arbitrary, you would have
no choice between this or that rule of law. If reason
could prove that this particular rule was the only possible
rule consistent with the principles of natural law, then
there would be no need for a duly constituted legislature
to give that rule the authority of law. Any competent
philosopher or jurist, even though a private citizen, would
have all the competence needed for the making of laws.
St. Thomas says that "a thing is called positive when it
proceeds from the human will." Hence if law proceeds
in any way from the human will, it is positive law; and if
natural law does not proceed in any way from the human
will, as it does not, then it is not law according to St.
Thomas, if we take seriously his remark that law must
proceed both from the will and the reason.
Natural law is law only if we look to God as its maker,
because, as St. Thomas says, it proceeds from the will as
well as from the reason of God. But if you consider natural law purely on the human level, whereon it is simply
discovered by reason, with no aid from the will, then,
being entirely a work of man's reason, natural law does
not meet St. Thomas's definition of law.
The difference between natural law and positive law is
tremendous. For instance, how is anything promulgated
on the human level? Obviously by speech or act. Thus
customs can promulgate laws because they are juridically
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significant actions; but obviously customs cannot promulgate natural laws. How, then, is the natural law promulgated? Is it promulgated in the same way as the positive
law?
The natural law, as St. Thomas points out in many passages, is promulgated by teaching. The man who knows
the principles of natural law can teach natural law in the
same way as the man who knows geometry can. He need
have no more authority than any other teacher-no greater authority than he has knowledge.
How does the legislature promulgate positive law?
There is nothing less like teaching than the promulgation
of law by a legislature. A legislature declares the law.
In the very best sense of the word, it makes law by fiat,
which means that the law gets its authority from the official or public authority of its maker, not his knowledge.
How do we learn what the positive law is? If we are
interested in the law of Indiana on a certain point, how
do we learn it? By teaching in the sense in which the
teacher is one who demonstrates conclusions from premises? Hardly. The law of Indiana can only be taught
by statement and it can only be learned by memory. This
is due to its arbitrary character as positive law. Thus we
see how ambiguous the word "promulgation" is when applied to natural and positive law-just as ambiguous as
the word "law" is.
St. Thomas says that the man who promulgates the law
must be a man who has the authority to do so. The authority he here refers to is that of the community or its
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vicegerent. Hence it cannot be natural law that he is
talking about. Such authority is not needed to promulgate natural law. This is confirmed by St. Thomas when
he says that a rule of law must have coercive force-that
it must compel obedience through fear of punishment, or,
failing that, through physical constraint.
St. Thomas further points out that the notion of law
contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human action,
and second, that it has coercive force. He goes on to say
that "a private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously, for he can only advise and if his advice be not
taken he has no corecive power such as the law should
have.... But this coercive power is vested in the whole
people or in some public personage to whom it belongs to
inflict penalties."
Does the natural law bind in conscience only or does it
also bind by its coercive power, by the fear of the penalties that follow from disobedience? Hobbes argues that
natural law involves natural punishment, i.e., there is a
natural penalty attached to natural law. But such is not
the full meaning of coercion. You are not constrained to
obey the natural law. Even if you consider the matter
theologically, and refer the natural law to God as its
maker, it still does not exercise coercive power to compel
obedience. Compulsion here means the exercise of force
to exact obedience to the positive law. Compulsion in this
sense never enforces the natural law.
VI
Let me summarize this and draw one conclusion.

I
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want to show you that natural and positive law cannot be
given the same definition, that no definition framed in
words can ever define both natural and positive law, for
they do not have the same essence. The following enumeration of properties, found in positive law but absent
in natural law, should make this clear.
(1) Positive law compels obedience, not merely
through fear of punishment, which also operates in the
case of natural law, but through actual compulsion by an
exertion of external force. There is nothing like this in
the sphere of natural law.
(2) Positive law is promulgated through extrinsic and
official promulgation, and then only through dogmatic
statement, not through rational proof. In the sphere of
natural law, the private individual can discover the natural law for himself by rational inquiry; and he can promulgate it to others by rational instruction.
(3) The positive law involves a free choice of the will.
It is the will which institutes one ordinance of reason
rather than another, and this element of choice is totally
absent from the natural law. As you have no choice between this and that conclusion in geometry, or between
this and that axiom, so you have no choice between this
or that principle or conclusion of natural law.
(4) Positive law, moreover, obliges only those who fall
within the power of the community wherein it is instituted; whereas natural law binds everyone without any
regard to his political associations.
(5) The rules of positive law can be repealed from time
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to time while natural law is, in a strict sense, immutable.
(6) The rules of positive law can be judged to be more
or less just relative to the constitution of the community
in which they are made, whereas there is no such relativity in the case of natural law.
With respect to each of the foregoing properties, the
natural law is either negative or contrary. Let me add
one more question which should provide another point of
differentiation. Is there any sense at all in talking about
a bad, an unjust, or a wrong natural law? Obviously not.
Yet we can say with very good sense, as we sometimes do,
that this is a just or unjust law. Of course, we mean a
rule of positive law.
These difficulties are not easily met. If one is going to
carry on the discussion of natural law in our law schools,
it may be necessary to do so entirely on the philosophical
level, not the theological. If this is to be done, the issue
between the naturalists and the positivists can be more
clearly put if the naturalists admit that natural law is not
law in the same sense-having the same definition and
with the same properties-as positive law. To defend his
position, the naturalist has only to demonstrate that positive rules are founded on rational principles, and that
positive rules can be criticized only by reference to universal standards. He should try to prevent the main issue
from becoming confused or obfuscated by his own ambiguous use of the word "law."
I think it is almost hopeless to ask those who have become accustomed to it to give up the phrase "natural
law." But if that cannot be done, then we must at every
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point make clear that we understand the tremendous difference in the meaning of the word "law" when we say
"natural law" and "positive law."
VII
The more we understand the difference between natural and positive law, the less likely, I think, we are to
make the mistake which was certainly made all through
the nineteenth century and, I regret to say, is still being
made in the world today-the mistake of appealing to
international law as the source of world peace. Because
he wanted peace above all else, Hobbes is concerned to
show that you had to have civil law, the law of a commonwealth, to keep the peace. The law of nature was
not sufficient. On this point I think Hobbes is much
sounder than Locke. Hobbes properly says that "the state
of nature is a state of war," even though men living in a
state of nature live under natural law.
Positive law without a foundation in natural law is
purely arbitrary. It needs the natural law to make it
rational. But natural law without positive law is ineffective for the purposes of enforcing justice and keeping
peace.
Nations, like individuals, who live together under natural law alone, are in a state of war, whether or not actual
shooting is going on. The world is as much in a state of
war today as it was five years ago. However sound morally the precepts of international law may be, as conclusions
deduced from natural law, they lack the coercive force of
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positive law. International law is not the kind of law
which can keep peace. World peace requires world government and the world-wide reign of positive law. It is
not sufficient to ask for a world-wide reign of law. It
must be a positive law.
The doctrine of natural law does the human race a
great disservice if it in any way obscures this fundamental
truth by empty eloquence concerning international law as
the foundation of international peace.

NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW*
N American jurisprudence, natural law is both a foundation and a stumbling block. It is a foundation,
because it lies at the root of our juristic tradition. It is
a stumbling block, because it is rejected by the prevailing philosophy.
The result is a legal system which is actually shaped
in large part by a doctrine which in the formal treatment
of the subject is vigorously denied. And what is more,
this rejection of the doctrine in many cases comes from
those who in the administration of our legal system often
apply the doctrine with confidence and satisfaction.
The lesson is clear. What the law most needs today is
to reexamine its parentage. The philosopher must reexamine it, to find what is truly ultimate in law. The
practitioner must reexamine it, so that he will know the
meaning of the instrumentalities with which he deals.
And by practitioner I mean not only attorney and counsellor, but all those who carry on the affairs of the law,
including legislator, judge and executive. All these may
draw a lesson from a conversation which once took place
between Henry Ford and three laborers. Mr. Ford asked
these workers one day what they were doing. The first
one said he was making a Collar an hour. The second
Also printed in 23 Notre Dame Lawyer 125 (1948).
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said he was laying bricks. The third said he was building
a church. Unless the lawyer sees justice as the objective,
he is merely working by the hour or laying bricks. And
if he sees that justice, and sees it in the very principle of
its being, he will see it in the subject of this Institute, in
the much belabored but perennial natural law.

The current denial of natural law is one of those strange
anachronisms in human thought by which, instead of going forward with a progressively clearer understanding of
a doctrine, the course of thought suddenly reverses itself
and turns backward toward ancient errors and discredited
sophistries. Natural law had pushed its way up from
cloudy apprehensions of it among the early Greeks and
Stoics to its position in mediaeval thought, whereby it was
recognized as the end principle of positive laws, the moral
limitation of the ruling power, and the foundation of free
government. At that point in history, the prospects were
bright. A new era had dawned. It was recognized that
the state was entitled to the allegiance of the people, but
it was also recognized that the rulers were the servants of
the people and ruled with their consent, and that the people possessed rights which were paramount to the will of
the ruler. The constitutional mechanism which would
define citizenship, restrain tyranny and enfranchise the
populace, was yet to be developed, but standing on the
mediaeval doctrine of the dignity of man and the nature
of society, its growth was clearly prefigured. But then a
curious thing happened. The mechanisms of constitution
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and ballot box went forward; but their doctrinal basis
began to disintegrate.
If we look at our own national life, we find these two
conflicting forces clearly at work. Natural law had persisted long enough in men's thinking to serve as the
explicit foundation of the American republic, both in its
political and its judicial aspects. Then the divergence
intrudes itself. The practitioners go on, extending the
constitutional framework and perpetuating the AngloAmerican ideals of reasonableness and natural justice as
the test of legislation and decision; but the philosophers
and theorists turn backward and strike with the vigor of
rebellion at the traditional basis of our boasted progress.
The habit of viewing laws as ultimately grounded in
norms inherent in the nature of man and society gave
way to analytical jurisprudence, which viewed laws as
pure facts wholly disconnected from morals; to historical
jurisprudence, for which the ultimate source of laws is
evolving custom; and to positivism of many varieties but
all of them united in the concept that under the ever
changing stream of fact there is no intelligible abiding
substratum and therefore no truth superior to the transient findings of experimental science. And if we wish
to look for the nethermost point to which this avalanche
of negation has carried us, we can find it in one of the
recently published Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound,
wherein the author says that the assertion "that the lawmaker should be led by justice and that the courts have
to 'administer justice' " is "completely senseless." Moreover, says the author, "There is no justice. Neither is
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there any objective 'ought.' . . . Thus the entire legal

ideology-including rights and duties, wrongfulness and
lawfulness-goes up in smoke." 1
There is a deep significance in the fact that natural law
continues to inspire and integrate our legal system in spite
of this defection of the theorists. For this very survival is
a fact which to the scientific mind should be suggestive
of a hidden reality worthy of inquiry and research.
The evidence of natural law in our system is so widespread as to be undeniable. In the first place, there is
implicit evidence of it in all those laws which reflect the
jus gentium, that is, laws which are so spontaneously expressive of the human conscience that they are characteristic of the legal systems of all civilized countries. Such
are the laws against murder, theft, treason and all those
acts deemed mala in se as contrasted with mala prohibita.
Such laws are but implicit evidence of natural law because, while they reflect natural law, they contain no
explicit reference to their natural law foundation. If the
foundation be doubted, however, one may ask, why are
certain evils considered mala in se? If there be no higher
law, why is not a statute dealing with murder in the same
class as a traffic ordinance or a law governing the endorsement of a negotiable instrument? The answer is that
however trenchant the negation of the philosophers the
lawmaker persists in considering himself as morally bound
in the one case and not in the other.
1 Vilhelm Lundstedt, Law and Justice: A Criticism of the Method of
justice in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES, ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF Rosco- POUND, 450, 451 (1947).
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But the case for natural law in our legal system does not
rest alone upon such implicit evidence of it, however cogent that evidence may be. There is explicit evidence of
it also.
It is conspicuously evident in equity, which received its
foundation from the importation into the Roman law of
the jus gentium and the Stoic morality as correctives for
the omissions and inequities of the jus civile. Later, under
the influence of Christianity, as Pomeroy says, "the signification of aequitas became enlarged, and was made to
embrace our modem conceptions of right, duty, justice,
and morality." 2 In England it was likewise in response
to the rigidity and incompleteness of legal forms that
equity arose, first in the conscience of the Chancellor and
next in a system of positive jurisprudence expressly founded upon the eternal verities of right and justice. As a
result, says Pomeroy, "the principles of right, justice, and
morality, which were originally adopted, and have ever
since remained, as the central forces of equity, gave it a
necessary and continuous power of orderly expansion,
which cannot be lost until these truths themselves are forgotten, and banished from the courts of chancery." 3
But perhaps the clearest and most explicit adoption of
natural law in our legal system occurs in the constitutional
guaranties of natural rights. These rights had been proclaimed with classic dignity and precision, in the preamble of the Declaration. The Declaration was echoed in
2 Po, .ov, A Treatise on Equity jurisprudence, Sec. 8 (5th ed, S. F.,
1941).
3 Op. cit., Sec. 59.
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the constitutions of some of the original states, as in that
of Virginia which still provides, "That all men are by
nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of
society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest
their posterity, namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."
While the Federal Constitution failed to incorporate
these principles in itself as the constitutions of Virginia
and other states had done, the same result was achieved
in our Federal system by a process which is now historic
and which bears eloquent witness to the vitality of natural law in our jurisprudence. This historic process was
initiated a century and a half ago in the doctrine of implied limitations of legislative power. A case in point is
Calder v. Bull, decided by the Supreme Court in 1798, in
which Justice Chase said, "I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state Legislature, ... although its authority
should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, ....
An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
authority ....
The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of
our state governments, amount to a prohibition of such
acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and
reason forbid them." 4 From this, Justice Iredell dissented, saying that in the absence of a constitutional pro4 3 Dallas 386, 387, 388, 1 L. ed. 648, 649 (1798).

NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW

vision the courts cannot invalidate a law "merely because
it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice." 5
The issue raised by Justices Chase and Iredell demanded a solution, for it went to the core of the Supreme
Court's responsibility. That the soltuion came in the
manner in which it did is a sign of that persistence of
natural law which defies its critics even to the present day.
The solution came in the due process clause, pursuant
to which no person may be deprived "of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
But what was "due process"? Was it, as its words imply, a mere procedural safeguard, or did it include substantive rights as well? Coke identified it with the phrase
"law of the land" in the thirty-ninth chapter of Magna
Charta, a phrase which Justice Johnson said was "intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive justice."

6

The signs were unmistakable. An express constitutional
clause being needed to satisfy those who were discontent
with implied limitations, due process was to supply the
need by including substantive rights.
The culmination occurred in the application of the due
process clause to state legislation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question was whether due process, interpreted in the substantive as well as the procedural
sense, served to bring under the protecting arms of the
5 3 Dallas 386, 399, 1 L. ed. 648, 654 (1798).
6 Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244, 4 L. ed. 559, 561

(1819).
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Fourteenth Amendment the entire bill of rights which
was contained in the first eight amendments. The Supreme Court's answer to that question constituted an
explicit judicial affirmation of natural law which is now
the settled doctrine of the Court. For in answer to the
question, the Court held that not all the enumerated
rights were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but
only those which involved those "immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government," 7 those "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions," 8 and those immunities "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 9 And moreover, said the Court,
this is so "not because those rights are enumerated in the
first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a
nature that they are included in the conception of due
process of law." 10
Thus natural law, excluded from the judicial chamber
7 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389, 42 L. ed. 780, 790 (1898).
8 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316, 71 L. ed. 270, 273 (1926).
9 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 82 L. ed. 288, 292 (1937).
The tests mentioned in the Palko and other cases cited were enumerated
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Louisiana v. Resweber, U. S. Supreme
Court L. ed. Advance Opinions, Vol. 91 - No. 5, pp. 359, 365 (1947).
In a special concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, U. S. Supreme Court L. ed. Advance Opinions, Vol. 91 No. 17, pp. 1464, 1476
(1947), Mr. Justice Frankfurter discussed the subject again, saying, "In
the history of thought 'natural law' has a much longer and much better
founded meaning and justification than such subjective selection of the first
eight Amendments for incorporation into the Fourteenth. If all that is
meant is that due process contains within itself minimal standards, which
are 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 82 L. ed. 288, 292, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937), putting
upon this Court the duty of applying these standards from time to time,
then we have merely arrived at the insight which our predecessors long
ago expressed."
10 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 99, 53 L. ed. 97, 106 (1908).
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as an abstraction, reentered the chamber in the concrete
garb of the constitution. It was an illustration of the fact,
frankly acknowledged by Justice Harlan in a later case,
that "the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so
restrained by technical rules that they could not find some
remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, ... that violated
natural justice." 11 It is also an illustration of the real-

ism of the poet Horace, "Naturam expellas furca, tamen
usque recurret. You may drive out nature with a pitchfork, yet it will always return." 12
It is to this adherence to natural law under the aegis of
due process that we are indebted for the protection by our
courts of one after the other of our cherished rights: the
inviolability of conscience, the right to express one's convictions, to acquire knowledge, to work at one's chosen
calling, to educate one's children, and to those other conditions of freedom and self-realization which, as the Court
says, are implicit in natural justice.
This persistence of natural law in the hands of the practical jurists is a sign of its compelling reasonableness, a
reasonableness which sets practitioner against theorist
even when they are combined in the same person. Nothing else can explain the phenomenon of Justice Holmes
who as a philosopher poured his scorn upon natural law,
but as a judge felt compelled to decide a case on what he
termed "fair play" and "substantial justice"; 13 or the
11 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Urited States, 216 U. S. 177, 195, 54
L. ed. 435, 443 (1910).
12 EPISTLES, I, x 24, quoted by HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL
LAw, 267 (St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1947).

13 McDonald v. Mabee, 243, U. S.90, 91, 92, 61 L. ed 608, 609, 610
(1917).
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more explicit confession of Judge Dillon who, though
accepting the doctrines of analytical and historical jurisprudence from a theoretic standpoint, abjured the doctrines in his practice, saying, "If unblamed I may advert
to my own experience, I always felt in the exercise of the
judicial office irresistibly drawn to the intrinsic justice of
the case, with the inclination, and if possible the determination, to rest the judgment upon the very right of the
matter. In the practice of the profession I always felt an
abiding confidence that if my case is morally right and
just it will succeed, whatever technical difficulties may
stand in the way; and the result usually justifies the confidence." 14
Looking therefore at our legal system in the concrete, it
may fairly be said that the sysetm possessed in large measure a natural law foundation, and that natural law has
continued to inspire and integrate it in conspicuous degree
in spite of the most persistent and devastating attack to
which a doctrine could possibly be exposed. Has this just
happened, or is there an abiding, objective link between
man-made laws and those first principles of the practical,
human reason to which, with greater or less fidelity and
subject to whatever lapses, man ever returns in the practical art of government by law? That it is the latter, analysis will surely show.
II

There are three levels of law. Since it is of the utmost
importance that these three levels be carefully distin14 LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA,
quoted by POUND, LAW AND MORALS 36, 37 (1926).

17 (1894),
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guished, a uniform terminology is greatly to be desired.
I will use the terminology proposed by Professor Morti15
mer J. Adler, namely, principles,precepts and rules.
Of these, the ultimate reality is the principle. It is the
practical judgment that good must be done and evil
avoided. It is not a conclusion drawn from premises by
reasoning, but in the sense an intuitive judgment, a selfevident or first principle. Hence it cannot be proved or
demonstrated, and by the same token it need not be
proved or demonstrated. It is the counterpart in the practical reason of the principle of contradiction in the theoretic reason. It is the starting point, the foundation, of
the science of right and wrong.
At the outset, it is important to observe a basic distinction. The principle Seek the good directs man to his end,
which is happiness, or the possession of what is good for
man as man. But man's nature being complex, his happiness involves a multiplicity of goods. Therefore, the first
principle may be expressed in two ways. It may be expressed simply Seek the good, to refer to the whole of
goods, or it may be broken down into several principles,
to refer to the various goods. Some of these goods relate
to man's private life. With these we are not here concerned. The good with which we are here concerned is
the common good, that is, the good of the whole community, which to the individual is but a partial good because man, though a social being, is not simply a social
being,-a distinction which, byi the way, separates a free
society from a totalitarian one.
15 A Question About Law, in ESSAYS IN THOMISM 207, 212 (1942).
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For our subject matter, therefore, the principle is Seek
the common good. This is the natural law, strictly speaking, or if by law we mean positive law, perhaps we may
better say this is the principle of laws. 16 But this principle, likewise, is capable of being broken down by analysis
into the three propositions expressed by Ulpian in the
third century, do good to others, avoid injuring others,
and render to each his own. The first two of these are
the principles of general justice, that is, of justice to the
community, and therefore they are also called legal or
social justice. The third-renderto each his own-is the
principle of special justice, that is, of justice to the individual, which from the viewpoint of the state is called
distributive justice and from the viewpoint of another
individual is called commutative justice.
The next level of law, which we will call precepts, is
made up of conclusions which are immediately and necessarily drawn from the principles and which constitute the
means for the attainment of the social good which is expressed by the principles. They are sometimes called the
secondary principles of the natural law. They consist
generally of the jus gentium which I have mentioned,
propositions which characterize the laws of all societies
because they are necessarily deduced from the principles.
It is true that these precepts are a part of the natural law,
in the sense that they are not of man's making but are
conclusions from the principles, but on the other hand
16 This proposal is made by Professor Adler in A Question About Law,

above cited. I think that the proposal constitutes an important contribution
to clarity on this subject, because of the confusion which has arisen from
use of the term law for both the principle and the rule.
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they differ from natural law strictly speaking in the sense
that they are the result of a process of reasoning, as contrasted with the indemonstrable and ultimate character of
the principles. Both principles and precepts are incapable by themselves of governing action,-for different reasons, however: in the case of principles, because they
specify only the end, and action depends on specification
of means; in the case of precepts, because they specify
the means only generally and without reference to the
contingent circumstances which are always involved in
action. The inadequacy of the precept in a specific case
may be illustrated by the precept against killing. Obviously the precept aims at wrongful killing, but it fails to
define the circumstances which makes killing wrongful as
against those which make it justifiable, and it also fails to
specify the punishment. What the precept needs, to serve
as a guide of action, is to be embodied in a more specific
mold, that is, to be determined by receiving that particularization necessary to bring it to bear upon the contingent facts of life as they exist in the concrete. It is akin
to the process by which a craftsman, in order to build a
house, determines the general form of a house to a particular shape. The house cannot come into concrete existence without the general form. The general form cannot
result in a house without the reduction to a particular
shape.
Out of this process of deteimination of precepts arises
the law in the lawyer's sense, the positive rules which govern specific cases. To this third level of law can be
applied St. Thomas Aquinas's definition of law as "an
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ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him
who has the care of the community, and promulgated." 17
When we enter this third level, we enter a new world,
which is in sharp contrast to that of the other two levels.
For whereas at the first two levels the reason is necessarily governed by objective "oughtness," either in the sense
of first principles or of conclusions necessarily drawn
therefrom, now, at the third level, all is tentative and uncertain, contingent and changeable. The reason is that
rules involve facts, from which two consequences flow.
The first is that since facts are infinite in number, they
cannot all be comprehended by human reason. Therefore any rule which is based upon them must be based
upon the generality of experience and will be defective
to the extent that it fails to provide for the unknown or
the unusual case. The second is that facts change, and
therefore laws must change, to preserve a reasonable relation to facts.
In comparison, therefore, with the principles and precepts of natural law, which are necessary propositions and
bind reason in their grasp, the rules of positive law are
relative, contingent and changeable. The tax statute, for
example, or the law governing the relations between capital and labor, or the law which will govern the use of
atomic power, represent efforts by the lawmaker to bring
the precepts of justice to bear upon facts of such inexhaustible complexity and profound changeability that the
justice of those laws can never be more than approximate
17 SUMMA THEOLOoICA,

I-I, q. 90, a. 4.
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and tentative. Therefore, far from being final or conclusive, they need amendment and revision to keep pace with
the findings of the social sciences and with the evolution
of the social order to which they apply.
It may be of passing interest to note that this doctrine
of the essential relativity and contingency of positive law,
which sounds so refreshingly modem in an age dominated
by science, was actually laid down by a mediaeval monk
writing in a monastic cell. In fact, so impressed was this
monk, St. Thomas, by the relativity of laws that he said
that "suitably to introduce justice into business and personal relations is more laborious and difficult to understand than the remedies in which consist the whole art of
medicine," 18 a confession which, in view of the state of
medicine in St. Thomas's day, was a confession indeed I
This should be the answer to criticisms based upon that
caricature of natural law by which men endeavored in the
last century to deduce a whole legal system from the principles of natural law. Positive rules are not deductions
from natural law; they are determinations of it. That is,
the area of the functioning of the lawmaker is coextensive
with the degree by which the precept is undetermined,
namely, by which it needs determination by reduction to
a particular form. And this particularization involves a
choice among matters which are in themselves indifferent,
because it is only to the extent that these matters are indifferent that the precept remains undetermined. Therefore it follows that positive laws or rules are the products
18 ETHICORUM, V, 15, quoted by ROMMEN, op. cit., 12 p. 252.
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of acts of the will, in that the will specifies the particular
determination to be made from among alternative indifferent ones, although of course the formulation of the
alternatives is made by the intellect. In other words, lawmaking is an art. It is a work of prudence. From this it
is also evident that laws are made, not discovered, except
in the natural principles in which they are ultimately
grounded.
This should also serve to answer the criticism of the
natural law as being a glittering generality, incapable of
governing the particular case. The natural law is not
designed to govern the particular case; but, as Pollock
said, neither are the general principles of any science. 19
A science is made up of principles and applications. Natural law is the principle of laws. Laws are the applications of that principle in the government of human
conduct. Without the laws, the principle is sterile. But
without the principle, the laws would be irresponsible and
anarchic.
. Finally, what has been said should undermine the
charge that natural law involves a fixity which is an obstacle to progress. Natural law is timeless, in that man is
eternally related to the common good and to his neighbor
by the bonds of justice. Law involves constancy and
change. The constancy is in the principle, which lies
behind the facts; the change is in the rule, which includes
19 Review of BRowN, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: ITS NATUtRE AND INTERESTS, XXXIX Law Quar. Rev. (1923), quoted by CHARLES GROVE
HAINES, TEE REVrVAL oF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 330 (1930).

NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW

the facts. Progress in law can come from two directions.
It can come from those changes in rules which are necessitated by greater knowledge of circumstances or by
change in circumstances. It can also come from an increased awareness of the natural law itself, as it has in the
abolition of slavery, the emancipation of women and the
recognition of the common good as the end of government, and let us hope, as it will some day, in the abolition
of racial discrimination and war.
III
Natural law has survived because men naturally think
in terms of it. The legal realists tried to exclude values
from laws, but in vain. The values which they thrust out
through one door reentered through another. And any
effort to place those values at any point short of the ultimate principles of the practical human reason is similarly
futile. There is no choice between these principles and
some other source of values. The only choice is between
values and an effort to remake man without values, the
consequences of which we have lately witnessed. These
consequences are not happy ones, and they are radically
alien to the tradition by which we live. Moreover, their
appearance in the twentieth century constitutes a warning
that however rugged is the force of natural law in human

thinking, there is no guaranty, even in a civilization in
which that doctrine has been the major thread for a mil-

lennium and a half, that that thread may not be temporarily lost, with results which threaten the extinction of
justice and the death of that civilization. Truth will rise
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again, though it be crushed to earth. But it can be
crushed to earth, and at this moment it is crushed to earth
in the larger portion of the globe.
We who retain the truth in our practice, toy with an
alien philosophy at our peril. As a man thinks, so is he,
or so he will be. Even now the signs are not wanting. A
moral science has discovered a divine power in the atom,
which for lack of values has already been used experimentally on human beings and now challenges not only
constitutional guaranties but life itself. The family, the
unit of society, is a vanishing institution. Education is on
a starvation diet, deprived of the fundamental orientations of philosophy and the things of the spirit. Thus we
in the democracies, on whom has fallen the burden of
world leadership in a critical hour, are ourselves "disregarding the omens and disdaining the stars." 20
If the legal philosophers persist in denying our birthright, salvation must lie with the practitioners, whose profession Dean Wigmore called a "priesthood of justice."
In order to discharge the duties of that priesthood, the
legal profession must recapture its standing as a learned
profession. And mere knowledge of facts is not learning,
even though those facts be laws. A higher intellectual
dedication remains, a dedication to those principles which
give to laws their meaning, their purpose and their ultimate claim to the allegiance of men.
If legal education takes its part in this high task, and if
the practitioner rises to the responsibility thus presented
20 G. K. Chesterton.
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to him, the day may yet be saved, and the struggle for
law and justice which has been the glory of Western civilization may be prolonged to avert that crisis which now
threatens to dim its light forever.
Harold R. McKinnon

THE ETERNAL LAW BACKGROUND OF
THE NATURAL LAW
Introduction
A

singular and truly providential coincidence reminds
us that exactly twenty-five years ago today Pope
Pius XI, of revered and saintly memory, was busily engaged in his study in the Vatican Palace, putting the finishing touches to the page proofs of the first Encyclical of
his renowned Pontificate. Significantly enough this Papal
Message to the world, published on December 23, 1922,
was entitled, "The Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of
Christ." 1 In this historical document the scholarly Pontiff appealed to the entire world to return to the basic
concepts of the Eternal Law of God, so that Europe and
the other countries of the world might be saved from impending chaos and disaster. In view of what has happened during these past twenty-five years, the warnings
of Pope Pius XI now seem ominously prophetic.
In this Encyclical Letter the Pope lamented that:
"There is, over and above the absence of peace and
the evil attendant on this absence, another deeper
and more profound cause for present-day conditions.
This cause was even beginning to show its head be1 Encyclical Letter, "Ubi arcano," December 23, 1922, Acta Apostolicae
Sedis, XIV (1922), 673-700. An English translation appears in Social Wellsprings, II, 13, 16 (edited by Joseph Husslein, S. J. Bruce, Milwaukee,
1942), and in Principles for Peace, 341, 345, (Washington, 1943, edited
by Harry C. Koenig).
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fore the war and the terrible calamities consequent
on that cataclysm should have proven a remedy for
them if mankind had only taken the trouble to understand the real meaning of those terrible events.
In the Holy Scriptures we read: 'They that have
forsaken the Lord shall be consumed.' No less wellknown are the words of the Divine Teacher, Jesus
Christ, Who said: 'Without Me you can do nothing'
and again, 'He that gathereth not with Me, scattereth.'
"These words of the Holy Bible have been fulfilled
and are now at this very moment being fulfilled before our very eyes. Because men have forsaken God
and Jesus Christ, they have sunk to the depths of
evil. They waste their energies and consume their
time and efforts in vain sterile attempts to find a
remedy for these ills, but without even being successful in saving what little remains from the existing
ruins.
"It was a quite general desire that both our laws and
our governments should exist without recognizing
God or Jesus Christ, on the theory that all authority
comes from men, not from God. Because of such an
assumption, these theorists fell short of being able to
bestow upon law not only those sanctions which it
must possess but also that secure basis for the supreme criterion of justice which even a pagan philosopher like Cicero saw clearly could not be derived
except for the Eternal Law. Authority itself lost its
hold upon mankind, for it had lost that sound and
unquestionable justification fo' its right to command
on the one hand and to be obeyed on the other. Society, quite logically and inevitably, was shaken to its
very depths and even threatened with destruction,
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since there was left to it no longer a stable foundation, everything having been reduced to a series of
conflicts, to the domination of the majority, or to the
supremacy of special interests." 2
Today, exactly a quarter of a century after the publication of this epochal Encyclical, nations still reject, in large
measure, the Eternal Law of God, which the Pope so accurately called the supreme criterion of justice. Thus
the world finds itself without peace, without justice, without the establishment of an abiding moral order.
"We have already seen," continues the same Pontiff,
"and have come to the conclusion that the principal
cause of the confusion, restlessness, and dangers,
which are so prominent a characteristic of false
peace, is the denial of the sovereignty of law and lack
of respect for authority, effects which logically follow
upon the denial of the truth that authority and power
come from God, the Creator of the world and its
Universal Law-giver. The only remedy for such a
state of affairs is the Peace of Christ, since the Peace
of Christ is the Peace of God, which could not exist
if it did not enjoin respect for law, order and su'3
preme authority."
In view of this solemn pronouncement given to the
world in 1922, we have good reason to pause and to ask
ourselves why precisely do so many human beings refuse
to acknowledge the existence of such a truth as the Eternal Law, emanating from God Himself, the Supreme
2 Principles for Peace, pp. 340-341; A.A.S. XIV (1922). 683.
3 Id., 1). 345.
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Legislator for all mankind? In other words, why are the
dice so heavily loaded against justice, truth, and the abiding peace of Jesus Christ?
The answer to this query has been given by another
great Pontiff, our present Holy Father, and significantly
enough, in his own first Encyclical Letter, addressed to the
world, on October 20, 1939. He states that:
"At the head of the road which leads to the spiritual and moral bankruptcy of the present day stand
the nefarious efforts of not a few to dethrone Christ,
the abandonment of the law of truth which He proclaimed and of the law of love which is the lifebreath of His kingdom. In the recognition of the
supreme prerogatives-of Christ, and in the return of
individuals and of society to the law of His truth and
of His love lies the only way to salvation....
"The present age, Venerable Brethren, by adding
new errors to the doctrinal aberrations of the past,
has pushed these to extremes which lead inevitably
to a drift towards chaos. Before all else, it is certain
that the radical and ultimate cause of the evils which
We deplore in modem society is the denial and rejection of a universal norm of morality as well for individual and social life as for international relations;
We mean the disregard, so common nowadays, and
the forgetfulness of the Natural Law itself, which has
its foundation in God, almighty Creator and Father
of all, supreme and absolute Lawgiver, all-wise and
just Judge of human actions. When God is denied,
every basis of morality is undermined; the voice of
conscience is stilled or at any rate grows very faint,
that voice which teaches even to the illiterate and to
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uncivilized tribes what is good and what is bad, what
lawful, what forbidden, and makes men feel themselves responsible for their actions to a supreme
Judge.
"The denial of the fundamentals of morality had
its origin in Europe, in the abandonment of that
Christian teaching of which the Chair of Peter is the
depository and exponent. That teaching had once
given spiritual cohesion to a Europe which, educated,
ennobled and civilized by the Cross, had reached
such a degree of civil progress as to become the
teacher of other peoples, of other continents. But,
cut off from the infallible teaching authority of the
Church, not a few separated brethren have gone so
far as to overthrow the central dogma of Christianity, the divinity of the Saviour, and have hastened
thereby the progress of spiritual decay.
"The Holy Gospel narrates that when Jesus was crucified, 'there was darkness over the whole earth,' a
terrifying symbol of what happened and what still
happens spiritually wherever incredulity, blind and
proud of itself, has succeeded in excluding Christ
from modem life, especially from public life, and has
undermined faith in God as well as faith in Christ.
The consequence is that the moral values by which
in other times public and private conduct was gauged
have fallen into disuse; and the much-vaunted laicization of society, which has made ever more rapid
progress, withdrawing man, the family and the state
from the beneficent and regenerating effects of the
idea of God and the teaching of the Church, has
caused to reappear, in regions in which for many
centuries shone the splendours of Christian civilization, in a manner ever clearer, ever more distinct,
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ever more distressing, the signs of a corrupt and corrupting paganism: 'There was darkness when they
crucified Jesus.'
"Many perhaps, while abandoning the teaching of
Christ, were not fully conscious of being led astray
by a mirage of glittering phrases, which proclaimed
such estrangement as an escape from the slavery in
which they were before held; nor did they then foresee the bitter consequences of bartering the truth
that sets free, for error which enslaves. They did not
realize that, in renouncing the infinitely wise and
paternal laws of God, and the unifying and elevating
doctrine of Christ's love, they were resigning themselves to the whim of a poor, fickle human wisdom;
they spoke of progress, when they were going back;
of being raised, when they grovelled; of arriving at

man's estate when they stooped to servility. They did
not perceive the inability of all human effort to re-

place the law of Christ by anything equal to it; 'they
became vain in their thoughts.'
"With the weakening of faith in God and in Jesus
Christ, and the darkening in men's minds of the light
of moral principles, there disappeared the indispensable foundation of the stability and quiet of that
internal and external, private and public, order,
which alone can support and safeguard the prosperity of states.
"It is true that, even when Europe had a cohesion of
brotherhood through identical ideals gathered from
Christian preaching, she wa0; not free from dissensions, convulsions and wars which laid her waste; but
perhaps they never felt the intense pessimism of today as to the possibility of settling them, for they had
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then an effective moral sense of the just and of the
unjust, of the lawful and of the unlawful which, by
restraining outbreaks of passion, left the way open to
an honourable settlement. In our days, on the contrary, dissensions come not only from the surge of
rebellious passion, but also from a deep spiritual
crisis which has overtaken the sound principles of
private and public morality." 4
4 AAS. XXXI, pp. 543-546.

I. THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST AND
THE ETERNAL LAW
Some eighty years ago, the Russian novelist, Dostoevski
(1821-1881) observed that the modem world rejects
Christ, as God, for the very simple reason that it wishes
to have no God at all. Many of our modem lawyers, it
appears, are reluctant to acknowledge Christ as God because such an admission would necessitate belief in the
Holy Trinity as the Supreme Legislator for mankind. But
as St. Thomas points out, we can have no clear concept of
the Eternal Law, in relation to the Natural Law, or to any
other Law, unless we humbly believe in Christ as Supreme
Legislator,5 as well as the Redeemer of mankind, and in
the Holy Trinity as the source of all Divine Life and Law.
Moreover, we should realize that the tacit assumption
that God simply does not count in law can be more dangerous to lawyers, particularly to young lawyers, than
positive opposition to God. n
5 Council of Trent, Session VI, On Justification, Canon XXI: "If anyone saith that Jesus Christ was given of God to men as a Redeemer in
Whom to trust and not also as a Legislator, Whom to obey, let him be
anathema."
6 At the present time, opposition offers a challenge to thinking human
beings whereas the subtle implication that Divine Authority does not exist
in the world is a most insidious form of modern sophistry. This status of
affairs simply confirms Christian believers in the realization of the truth
that human nature in its present state is a fallen human nature redeemed
by Jesus Christ Who is the Supreme Legislator of mankind as well as its
Reedemer. The soul of an unbaptized, unregenerated human being, who is
filled with mundane desires and erroneous opinions, can well have the
understanding so darkened that neither the sunlight of natural reason nor
the supernatural Wisdom of God may illumine it clearly. Pope Leo XIII,
Encyclical Letter, "Libertas Praestanti.'simum," June 20, 1888, The Great
Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII, 137-145.
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I.

THE MOST HOLY TRINITY AND
THE ETERNAL LAW

When we ask the modem lawyer to contemplate with
reverence and humility the divine life of the Holy Trinity,
we are merely asking him to go back in spirit to the American, European and Semitic traditions of our laws, of our
civilization and of our Christian culture. In 529, when
the Emperor Justinian promulgated his renowned Code
of Roman Law, he specifically invoked and embodied in
his legislation, the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, just
as he dedicated his Institutes to Jesus Christ, the Supreme
Legislator of mankind. Thenceforward it became the
custom of truly Christian nations to acknowledge, in all
legislation, the dependence of humankind upon the Divine Creator and Legislator. Thus it was, that lawyers,
legislators and judges alike, constantly envisioned and
proclaimed their humble belief in God when they studied
law, enacted legislation or adjudged lawsuits.
It is heartening to note that ten years ago this month
when the Constitution of the Irish Free State went into
effect, on December 29, 1937, it began with these solemn
words: - "In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from
Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all
actions both of men and of States must be referred, We,
the People of Ireland, humbly acknowledging all our obligations to Our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained
our Fathers through centuries of trial . . . do hereby

adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution."
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THE ETERNAL LAW

Only three months ago, the Constitution of the State of
New Jersey ratified on September 10, 1947, acknowledged
its humble gratitude to God in these significant words: "We, the people of the State of New Jersey, grateful to
Almighty God for the civil and religious liberty which He
hath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him for
a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the
same unimpaired to succeeding generations, do ordain
and establish this Constitution."
As one ponders the faith, humility, and commendable
common sense of the Preambles to these Constitutions,
one realizes how frightfully hollow and inept were the
opening words of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
signed in 1920,

.

. "The high contracting parties ..."

What a godless, inane, and hopeless introduction to a
Covenant destined to maintain peace, justice, and charity
in a war-tom world. Can one wonder then, why a second
World War followed so soon after Versailles?
The origin of all law goes back, as St. Thomas striking,
ly points out, to the Holy Trinity, back to that life of
knowledge and love, which constitutes the essential glory
of the Three Divine Persons. 7 The Divine Word became
incarnate in order to illumine from without, the fire of
this glory, in bestowing upon mankind the knowledge and
love of the Most Holy Trinity. Well indeed then is He
called "The Splendor of the Glory of the Father" 8 come
as He tells us Himself, "Not to destroy, but to fulfill the
law." 9
7 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Questions XC-XCI,
aIX-Cx.

8 St. Paul, Epistle to the Hebrews, 1, 3.
9 St. Matthew 5, 17.
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"In the language of philosophy, God is in intimate
contact with all things, by His Power, by His essence,
and by His Presence. The exercises of His Power on
things does not cease with their creation. Conservation is a continual creation. Without the uninterrupted influence of God, nothing could continue in
existence. Since the Lord's power and the exercise
of that power is at the heart of all this, His Essence
must, of necessity, be there also; for in Him Power,
Essence, Operation, Nature are one Indivisible, Simple Reality. Finally, the Creator is present everywhere because there is nothing that escapes His
observation and attention. Wherever therefore, there
is any created reality, God is present in the totality
of His being, with all His being, with all His attributes and all His perfections. He is in my body and
in every fibre of it. He is in my soul, and in its faculties, and in the activities of these faculties. He is in
me wholly, and He is wholly outside of me. And just
as He is in me in the totality of what He is, so is He
likewise in all creatures.
"But beyond this universal and ordinary way according to which God is in all creatures, there is a distinct
way of presence which can be found only in the case
of rational creatures. In these He can be present as
an object known and loved is present in him who
knows and loves. An example drawn from nature
will illustrate the difference between these modes of
presence. Light shines in the eyes of the blind, in
whom the organ of vision is intact and the nerve only
destroyed. The eye is flooded with light, but there is
no vital reaction. The rays are fully present in the
eye but not to the eye. The visual faculty is powerless to possess by a vital act, what is, nevertheless,
sending its vibrations through the organ of vision.
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Furthermore in the case where the eye is not diseased, the measure of its possession of what is presented to its gaze is not unvarying. Objects of vision
may be maintained under the same conditions of
illumination, yet they will be seen more or less perfectly according to the strength, power and acuity of
the visual faculties of those who contemplate them.
They are seen, and therefore more perfectly possessed, by those whose vision is more perfect.
"It is thus in a parallel manner between God and the
soul, through which He pours the light of His being.
He shines on all things, whether in the mineral
realm, in the realm of plants, or in the realm of animals; and He shines also even in the souls of the sinner. But there is nowhere in these worlds an answering reaction. He is present in them, but not to them.
They do not possess Him, even when they are submitting to His influence. And when the blindness of
sin is dispelled and He illuminates the souls of the
just from their very centre; when He is present not
only in them but to them, even then He is not present
to all and possessed by all in the same degree. He is
more perfectly in, and more fully possessed by those
whose grace is more abundant and whose sanctity is
more elevated. It is sanctity that sharpens the soul's
vision and strengthens the soul's embrace of its God.
"Hence, just as the faculty of vision, when in a
healthy state, has power to receive within itself and
to possess in a vital act the figures of coloured objects,
so, too, the soul when endowed with sanctifying
grace, has power to seize and to take to itself, has
power to react vitally to the divine light streaming
from its source. The faculty of intelligence fortified
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by the infused virtue of faith, can fix its gaze on God
as He is in His own inner life. The faculty of will,
reinforced by the infused virtue of love for the divine,
is empowered to cleave to God in acts of real affection. These two faculties are, as it were, the arms by
which the soul is enabled to enfold the Holy Spirit in
its embrace." "I
III. THE MEANING OF THE ETERNAL LAW
With these remarks in mind let us try to grasp the
meaning of the Eternal Law, in relation to all law and
particularly in relation to the Natural Law. Briefly, the
Eternal Law is naught else but the exemplar of Divine
Wisdom directing all actions and movements.1 1 Or as St.
Augustine prefers to say, "It is the supreme exemplar to
which we must always conform." 12
From all Eternity there was present to the Spirit of God
the plan of the government of the world, which He had
determined to create. This plan of government is the
Eternal Law, according to which God guides all things
toward their final goal, namely, His own glory and the
eternal happiness of mankind. 13 There is nothing, therefore, which does not come under this law, neither star, nor
tide, nor plant, nor animal, nor man, nor Angel, for
Divine Providence extends to all.
"The Eternal Law is God's wisdom, inasmuch as it
is the directive norm of all movement and action.
When God willed to give existence to creatures, He
10 James Leen, By Jacob's Well, (New York, 1940), 112-114.
11 St. Thomas, Summa, 1-11, Quest. XCIII, Art. 1, ad 3.

12 St. Augustine, Do Lib. Arbitrio, I, 6 (PL 32, 1229).
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willed to ordain and direct them to an end. In the
case of inanimate things, this Divine direction is provided for in the nature which God has given to each.
...

Like all the rest of creation, man is destined by

God to an end, and receives from Him a direction
toward this end. This ordination is of a character in
harmony with man's free, intelligent nature.
"In virtue of his intelligence and free will, man is
master of his conduct. Unlike the things of the material world he can modify his action at will, he is
free to act or to refrain from action, just as he sees
fit. Yet he is not a lawless being in an ordered universe. In the very constitution of his nature, he likewise has a law laid down for him, reflecting that
ordination and direction of all things, which is the
Eternal Law." 14
As Pope Leo XIII states in his Encyclical Letter on
"Human Liberty,"
"reason prescribes to the will what it should seek
after or shun, in order to the eventual attainment of
man's last end, for the sake of which all his actions
are to be performed. This dictate of reason is called
law. In man's free will, therefore, or in the moral
necessity of our voluntary acts being in accordance
with reason, lies the very root of the necessity of law.
Nothing more foolish can be uttered or conceived
than the notion that because man is free by nature,
he is therefore exempt from law. Were this the case,
it would follow that to become free we must be deprived of reason; whereas the truth is that we are
55.

13 V. Cathrein, v. "Concept of Law," The Catholic Encyclopedia, IX,

14 James J. Fox, v. "The Natural Law," The Catholic Encyclopedia,
IX, 76-77.
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bound to submit to law precisely because we are free
by our very nature. Law then is the guide of man's
actions. It turns him towards good by its rewards,
and deters him from evil by its punishments.
"Foremost in this office comes the Natural Law,
which is written and engraved in the mind of every
man; and this is nothing but our reason, commanding
us to do right and forbidding sin. Nevertheless all prescriptions of human reason can have force of law
only inasmuch as they are the voice and the interpreters of some higher power on which our reason
and liberty necessarily depend. For, since the force
of law consists in the imposing of obligations and the
granting of rights, authority is the one and only foundation of all law-the power, that is, of fixing duties
and defining rights, as also of assigning the necessary
sanctions of reward and chastisement to each and all
of its commands. But all this, clearly, cannot be
found in man, if, as his own supreme legislator, he is
to be the rule of his own actions. It follows therefore that the law of nature is the same thing as the
Eternal Law, implanted in rational creatures, and inclining them to their right action and end; and can
be nothing else but the eternal reason of God, the
Creator and Ruler of all the world.
"To this rule of action and restraint of evil God has
vouchsafed to give special and most suitable aids for
strengthening and ordering the human will. The
first and most excellent of these is the power of His
divine grace, whereby the mind can be enlightened
and the will wholesomely invigorated and moved to
the constant pursuit of moral good, so that the use of
our inborn liberty becomes at once less difficult and
less dangerous. Not that the divine assistance hin-
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ders in any way the free movement of our will; just
the contrary, for grace works inwardly in man and
in harmony with his natural inclinations, since it
flows from the very Creator of his mind and will, by
whom all things are moved in conformity with their
nature. As the Angelic Doctor points out, it is because divine grace comes from the Author of nature,
that it is so admirably adapted to be the safeguard of
all natures, and to maintain the character, efficiency,
and operations of each.
"What has been said of the liberty of individuals is no
less applicable to them when considered as bound
together in civil society. For, what reason and the
Natural Law do for individuals, that human law, promulgated for their good, does for the citizens of
States. Of the laws enacted by men, some are concerned with what is good or bad by its very nature;
and they command men to follow after what is right
and to shun what is wrong, adding at the same time
a suitable sanction. But such laws by no means derive their origin from civil society; because just as
civil society did not create human nature, so neither
can it be said to be the author of the good which befits human nature, or of the evil which is contrary
to it.

"Laws come before men live together in society, and
have their origin in the Natural, and consequently in
the Eternal, Law. The precepts, therefore, of the
Natural Law, contained bodily in the laws of men,
have not merely the force of human law, but they
possess that higher and Tmore august sanction which
belongs to the law of nature and the Eternal Law.
And within the sphere of this kind of laws, the duty
of the civil legislator is, mainly, to keep the commun-
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ity in obedience by the adoption of a common discipline and by putting restraint upon refractory and
viciously inclined men, so that, deterred from evil,
they may turn to what is good, or at any rate may
avoid causing trouble and disturbance to the State.
"Now there are other enactments of the civil authority, which do not follow directly, but somewhat remotely, from the Natural Law, and decide many
points which the law of nature treats only in a general and indefinite way. For instance, though nature
commands all to contribute to the public peace and
prosperity, still whatever belongs to the manner and
circumstances, and conditions under which such
service is to be rendered must be determined by the
wisdom of men and not by Nature herself. It is in
the constitution of these particular rules of life, suggested by reason and prudence, and put forth by
competent authority, that human law, properly so
called, consists, binding all citizens to work together
for the attainment of the common end proposed to
the community, and forbidding them to depart from
this end; and in so far as human law is in conformity
with the dictates of nature, leading to what is good,
and deterring from evil.
"From this it is manifest that the Eternal Law of God
is the sole standard and rule of human liberty, not
only in each individual man, but also in the community and civil society which men constitute when
united. Therefore, the true liberty of human society
does not consist in every man doing what he pleases,
for this would simply end in turmoil and confusion,
and bring on the overthrow of the State; but rather
in this, that through the injunctions of the civil law
all may more easily conform to the prescriptions of
the Eternal Law.
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"Likewise, the liberty of those who are in authority
does not consist in the power to lay unreasonable and
capricious commands upon their subjects, which
would equally be criminal and would lead to the ruin
of the commonwealth; but the binding force of human laws is in this, that they are to be regarded as
applications of the Eternal Law, and incapable of
sanctioning anything which is not contained in the
Eternal Law, as in the principle of all law. Thus St.
Augustine most wisely says: 'I think that you can see,
at the same time, that there is nothing just and lawful, unless what men have gathered from this Eternal
Law.' If, then, by any one in authority, something be
sanctioned out of conformity with the principles of
right reason, and consequently hurtful to the commonwealth, such an enactment can have no binding
force of law, as being no rule of justice, but certain
to lead men away from that good which is the very
end of civil society.
"Therefore, the nature of human liberty, however it
be considered, whether in individuals or in society,
whether in those who command or in those who
obey, supposes the necessity of obedience to some supreme and Eternal Law, which is no other than the
authority of God, commanding good and forbidding
evil. And so far from this most just authority of God
over men diminishing, or even destroying their liberty, it protects and perfects it. For the real perfection
of all creatures is found in the prosecution and attainment of their respective ends; but the supreme
end to which human liberty must aspire is God.
"These precepts of the truest and highest teaching,
made known to us by the light of reason itself, the
Church, instructed by the example and doctrine of
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her divine Author, has ever propagated and asserted;
for she has ever made them the measure of her office
and of her teaching to the Christian nations. As to
morals, the laws of the Gospel not only immeasurably surpass the wisdom of the heathen, but are an
invitation and an introduction to a state of holiness
unknown to the ancients; and, bringing man nearer
to God, they make him at once the possessor of a
more perfect liberty. Thus the powerful influence of
the Church has ever been manifested in the custody
and protection of the civil and political liberty of the
people. The enumeration of its merits in this respect
does not belong to our present purpose. It is sufficient to recall the fact that slavery, that old reproach of the heathen nations, was mainly abolished
by the beneficent efforts of the Church.
"The impartiality of law and true brotherhood of
man were first asserted by Jesus Christ; and His
apostles re-echoed His voice when they declared that
in future there was to be neither Jew, nor Gentile,
nor Barbarian, nor Scythian, but all were brothers in
Christ. So powerful, so conspicuous in this respect,
is the influence of the Church, that experience testifies how savage customs are no longer possible in any
land where she has once set her foot; but that gentleness speedily takes the place of cruelty, and the light
of truth quickly dispels the darkness of barbarism.
Nor has the Church been less lavish in the benefits
she has conferred on civilized nations in every age,
either by resisting the tyranny of the wicked, or by
protecting the innocent and helpless from injury; or
finally by using her influence in the support of any
form of government which commended itself to the
citizens at home, because of its justice, or was feared
by their enemies without, because of its power.

THE ETERNAL LAW

"Moreover, the highest duty is to respect authority,
and obediently to submit to just law; and by this the
members of a community are effectually protected
from the wrongdoing of evil men. Lawful power is
from God, 'and whosoever resisteth authority resisteth the ordinance of God'; wherefore obedience is
greatly ennobled when subjected to an authority
which is the most just and supreme of all. But where
the power to command is wanting, or where a law is
enacted contrary to reason, or to the Eternal Law, or
to some ordinance of God, obedience is unlawful, lest,
while obeying man, we become disobedient to God.
Thus, an effectual barrier being opposed to tyranny,
the authority in the State will not have all its own
way, but the interests and rights of all will be safeguarded-the rights of individuals, of domestic society, and of all the members of the commonwealth;
all being free to live according to law and right reason; and in this, as We have shown, true liberty
really consists." 15
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ETERNAL
LAW AND CREATION
St. Thomas explains the relationship that exists between the Eternal Law and all creation in such a brief
and illuminating way that we can best borrow a few of
his unforgettable thoughts.
"Since all things subject to Divine Providence are
ruled and measured by the Eternal Law, it is evident
that all things partake in some way in the same Eternal Law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprint15 Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, "Libertas Praestantissimum," June
20, 1888, The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII, (New York, Benziger Brothers, 1903), 139-144.
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ed on them, they derive their respective inclinations
to their proper actions and ends.
"Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine Providence in a more excellent way,
in so far as it itself partakes of a share of Providence,
by being provident both for itself and for others.
Therefore, it has a share of the eternal reason....
"The light of natural reason, whereby we discern
what is good and what is evil, which is the proper
function of the Natural Law, is nothing else than an
imprint on us of Divine Light. It is, therefore, evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the
rational creature's sharing in the Eternal Law .... -16
In view of the intimate relationship that exists between
God and law, we can readily understand why peoples and
nations begin to ridicule and to reject law, and particularly the Natural and Eternal Law, precisely in the measure
in which they cease to believe in Christ, as God. This is
just another reason, it appears, why we Americans of the
present generation have the special and personal responsibility to warn the skeptics, as well as the uninformed,
that it is a law of life, as proved by history, that the "Natural, as well as the Eternal, Law invariably buries its
undertakers."
As some of you perhaps recall, in 1925, Theodore
Dreiser wrote his American Tragedy. Unfortunately, he
himself proved to be a living embodiment of the great
American tragedy, by cutting himself off from the religion
and beliefs of his childhood. As a result, he was a sad,
16 St. Thomas, Summa,

I,

Quest. 91, Art. 2.
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discontented, bewildered man in the last years of his life.
In his book, The Stoic, he wrote this haunting lament: "Chronically nebulous, doubting, uncertain, I stared at
everything, only wondering, not solving."
During the past twenty-five years a great deal of American law, American jurisprudence, and American legal
writings have become chronically nebulous, doubting, uncertain, staring at everything, only wondering, not solving.
Unless we return to the true understanding of law, the
future will be one of chagrin, of bewilderment, of tragedy.
Ours is the privilege, ours is the heritage, ours is the sacred personal duty "to restore all things under the Head7
ship of Christ," the Universal Lawgiver.'
Can any legal system long survive, when it is being
ceaselessly and systematically assailed by myriads of sophistries, erroneous juristic concepts, by the pragmatism of
an omnicompetent State, by the naturalism of a Dewey,
the sociological jurisprudence of a Pound, the scoffing
skepticism of a Holmes, the relativism of a Cardozo, the
positivism of a Hohfeld, the functionalism of a Cohen, the
symbolism of an Arnold, the realism of a Llewellyn, or the
utilitarianism of a Frankfurter? 18 Such bewildering systems-most of them godless-of law and of jurisprudence
have become a definite menace to our American Law and
legal thought. Under the very aegis of the Goddess of
17 St. Paul, Epistle to the Ephesian,, 1, 10.
18 Geoffrey OConnell, Naturalism ir. American Education, (New York,
1938); Man and Modern Secularism, Essays on the Conflict of the Two
Cultures, (New York, 1940); M. T. Rooney, Lawlessness, Law, and Sanction, (Washington, 1937), "Relativism in American Law," Proceedings of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1945, "Mr. Justice Cardozo's Relativism," The New Scholasticism, XIX (1945), 1-45.
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Justice, un-Christian publicists and even jurists are subjecting American Law to a slavery of the spirit, and are
reducing us free Americans to the status of benighted
morons, stripped of our personal, God-given dignity, and
bereft of our basic rights. In truth, these sciolists are the
very ones against whom St. Paul indignantly inveighs in
his First Epistle to Timothy, when he writes: "There are certain ones who have gone astray, wandering off into silly sophistries. They claim to be
teachers of the law, but they understand neither the
meaning of their own words, nor the assertions which
they so arrogantly proclaim." 19
In his Christmas Allocution of December 24, 1942,
Pope Pius XII alluded to this same tendency manifesting
itself in many quarters of the globe, when he said: "Outside the Church of Christ, juridical positivism
has reigned supreme, attributing a deceptive majesty
to the enactment of purely human laws, and effectuating the fateful divorce of law from morality." 20
If we are ever going to have an abiding moral order in
America and lasting international peace, we must reestablish a truly Christian juridical order of life, based on
the immutable principles of the Eternal Law.
In his autographical letter to President Truman on
August 26, 1947, Pope Pius XII emphasized the necessity
of changeless principles as a guarantee of abiding peace in
the world.
"What is proposed, is to ensure the foundations of a
lasting peace among nations. It were indeed futile
19 St. Paul, First Epistle to Timothy, 1, 7.
20 A.A.S. XXXIV (1942), 338-343.
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to promise long life to any building erected on shifting sands or a cracked and crumbling base. The
foundations, We know, of such a peace-the truth
finds expression once again in the letter of Your Excellency-can be secure only if they rest on bed-rock
faith in the one, true God, the Creator of all men. It
was He Who of necessity assigned man's purpose in
life; it is from Him, with consequent necessity, that
man derives personal, imprescriptible rights to pursue that purpose and to be unhindered in the attainment of it.
"Civil society is also of divine origin and indicated by
nature itself; but it is subsequent to man and meant
to be a means to defend him and to help him in the
legitimate exercise of his Godgiven rights. Once the
State, to the exclusion of God, makes itself the source
of the rights of the human person, man is forthwith
reduced to the condition of a slave, of a mere civic
commodity to be exploited for the selfish aims of a
group that happens to have power. The order of
God is overturned; and history surely makes it clear
to those who wish to read, that the inevitable result
is the subversion of order between peoples, is war.
The task, then, before the friends of peace is clear.
"Is Your Excellency over-sanguine in hoping to find
men throughout the world ready to cooperate for
such a worthy enterprise? We think not. Truth has
lost none of its power to rally to its cause the most
enlightened minds and noblest spirits. Their ardour
is fed by the flame of righteous freedom struggling to
break through injustice and lying. But those who
possess the truth must be conscientious to define it
dearly when its foes cleverly distort it, bold to defend
it and generous enough to set the course of their lives,
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both national and personal, by its dictates. This will
require, moreover, correcting not a few aberrations.
Social injustices, racial injustices and religious animosities exist today among men and groups who
boast of Christian civilization, and they are a very
useful and often effective weapon in the hands of
those who are bent on destroying all the good which
that civilization has brought to man. It is for all
sincere lovers of the great human family to unite in
wresting those weapons from hostile hands. With
that union will come hope that the enemies of God
and free men will not prevail.
"Certainly Your Excellency and all defenders of the
rights of the human person will find whole-hearted
cooperation from God's Church. Faithful custodian
of eternal Truth and loving mother of all, from her
foundation almost two thousand years ago, she has
championed the individual against despotic rule, the
labouring-man against oppression, Religion against
persecution. Her divinely-given mission often brings
her into conflict with the powers of evil, whose sole
strength is in their physical force and brutalized
spirit, and her leaders are sent into exile or cast into
prison or die under torture.
"This is history of today. But the Church is unafraid.
She cannot compromise with an avowed enemy of
God. She must continue to teach the first and greatest commandment incumbent on every man: 'thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,
with thy whole soul, with all thy strength,' and the
second like unto the first: 'thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' It is her changeless message, that
man's first duty is to God, then to his fellow-man;
that that man serves his country best who serves his
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God most faithfully; that the country that would
shackle the word of God given to men through Jesus
Christ helps not at all the lasting peace of the world.
In striving with all the resources at her power to
bring men and nations to a clear realization of their
duty to God, the Church will go on as she has always
done, to offer the most effective contribution to the
world's peace and man's eternal salvation.
"We are pleased that the letter of Your Excellency
has given Us the opportunity of saying a word of encouragement for all those who are gravely intent
on buttressing the fragile structure of peace until its
foundation can be more firmly and wisely established.
The munificent charity shown by the American people to the suffering and oppressed in every part of
the world, truly worthy of the finest Christian traditions, is a fair token of their sincere desire for universal peace and prosperity. The vast majority of the
peoples of the world, We feel sure, share that desire,
even in countries where free expression is smothered.
God grant their forces may be united towards its realization. There is no room for discouragement or
for relaxing of their efforts. Under the gracious and
merciful providence of God, the Father of all, what
is good and holy and just will in the end prevail." 21
V. REASONS FOR THE NEED OF A
DIVINE ETERNAL LAW
Lawyers who are not truly versed in the history and
philosophy of law sometimes ask why there should be any
21 A.A.S. XXXIX (1947),

380-382.
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need of a Divine Eternal Law in addition to the Natural
Law and Human Laws.2 2 We need but enumerate a few
reasons.
First of all, man is directed to perform his proper
actions in view of the final purpose of his existence. If
man were destined only to a purely natural end, then
there would be no need for any further direction on the
part of his reason in addition to the Natural Law and
Human Law. However, since man is destined to an end
of eternal happiness, which far transcends man's natural
ability, it is necessary that he should be guided by a Godgiven law. We know that by the Natural Law, the Eternal Law is participated proportionately to the capacity of
human nature. Man, however, needs a higher way in
which to be directed to his supernatural end. For this
reason God gives an additional law to man, whereby he
shares more perfectly in the Eternal Law.
The second reason for the Divine Eternal Law is that
different people form diverse judgments on human
actions, especially when dealing with contingent and abstruse matters. This is due principally to the instability
and uncertainty of human judgment, from which would
result divergent and even contrary laws.
"Men's judgments, like their watches:
None goes just alike,
But each believes his own."
Wherefore, in order that man may clearly know, without
any doubt, what he ought to do and what to avoid, it was
necessary for him to be directed in his proper actions by
22 St. Thomas, Summa, 1-II, Quest. 91, Art. 4.
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the unerring law of God Himself, that is, the Divine Eternal Law.
The third reason is that man can enact laws only in
those matters of which he is competent to judge. Now,
we all know that a man is not capable of judging the interior, hidden and secret movements of another's soul, but
only of the external, manifest acts. For the perfection of
virtue and of mankind, it is necessary that man conduct
himself uprightly in interior acts, as well as in external
affairs. It is clear that no Human Law could adequately
and effectively direct or control the interior acts. Hence,
the necessity of the Divine Eternal Law.
The final reason adduced for the Divine Law, and given
to us by St. Augustine, is that no Human Law can possibly
forbid all evil deeds and misdemeanours. Any system of
Human Law that would try to do so, would be so restrictive and repressive, that the Blue Laws of the Puritans
would appear like a Roman holiday. 23 In other words, it
is just humanly impossible for any human legislator to
forbid all secret, hidden thoughts and motives. In order,
therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine Law to supervene, in virtue of which all sins, secret as well as manifest,
are forbidden.
VI. EXISTENCE OF A TRUE ETERNAL LAW
Some few years ago a writer, who was more sardonic
than profound, claimed that "&ere really can be no Eternal Law. Every law, he asserted, is imposed on someone.
23 De Lib. .Arbitro, I, 5, PL 32, 1228.
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And there was really no one existing from all eternity on
whom the Eternal Law could have been imposed, because
God alone exists from eternity.
To this sophistry it is easy to reply that those things
which do not exist in themselves, exist in God, inasmuch
as they are known and preordained by Him Who, as St.
Paul says, "calls nonexistent beings as though they were
existent." 24 Hence, we see that the eternal concept of
the Divine Law bears the character of an Eternal Law,
in so far as it is ordained by God for the government of
creatures known to Him, even before they were called
25
into actual being.
VII. DERIVATION OF ALL LAWS FROM
THE ETERNAL LAW
Not only does every rational creature know more or less
about the Eternal Law, but human beings should become
increasingly aware of the fact, that every true law is derived in some way from the Divine Eternal Law. This
might be demonstrated in the following manner. Law
denotes a plan, directing acts toward an end. Now there
is in life a sort of hierarchical order whereby plans and
directives emanate from higher authority to lower authority, such as we see in Federal Laws, State Laws, County
26
Laws, Municipal Statutes, and the like.
24 St. Paul, Epistle to the Romans, 4, 17.
25 St. Thomas, Summa, I-II, Quest. 91, Art. 1, ad 1.
26 The Church offers a more striking example of this principle in her
universal laws, the enactments of ecumenical councils (Canons 222-229),
the statutes of plenary and provincial councils (Canons 281-292), the
statutes of diocesan synods (Canons 356-362), and the like.
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Since the Eternal Law is that supreme and exalted plan
of government existing in God Himself, the Supreme
Legislator, all plans of government on inferior planes are
derived from the Eternal Law. Hence it is that all laws,
in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from
the Eternal Law. In other words, all that is just and lawful in temporal laws is derived from the Eternal Law.27
In the Morgan Library on Madison Avenue in New
York City, there is an interesting, illuminated Manuscript
of the fourteenth century, from the University of Bologna.
The Manuscript is a treatise on law. An artist of consummate ability has embellished the parchment at the
beginning of the text with a painting of the Almighty
Father, seated, as it were, in a medieval Court Room,
with the Divine Son and the Holy Ghost, surrounded, in
turn, by innumerable Angels, the Apostles and the heavenly Court, despatching two Archangels to earth. One
Archangel presents to a king the book of law for all temporal kingdoms. The second Archangel offers to a Pope
a similar volume, containing the laws of the Church. It
was in this beautiful and simple way, that both the medieval artist and jurist understood, depicted and described
the derivation of all law from the Eternal Law of God.
VIII. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ETERNAL LAW
An objection that is sometimes made to the notion of
an Eternal Law is that a person cannot possibly be obligated by a law about which he knows nothing. And we
27 St. Thomas, Summa, Quest. 93, Art. 3.
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realize that there are many people, even lawyers, they tell
us, who profess to know little or nothing about the Eternal
Law. Fortunately, St. Thomas answers this objection in
a masterly way: -

"A thing may be known in two ways: first in itself;
secondly, in its effects, in which some likeness of that
thing is found. For instance, someone, not seeing the
sun in its substance, may know it, by its rays. Hence,
we must admit that no one can know the Eternal
Law, as it is in itself, except God and the Blessed who
see God in His essence." 28
Every rational creature, however, knows the Eternal
Law according to some reflection, in a greater or lesser
degree. Knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and
sharing of the Eternal Law, which is unchangeable truth,
as St. Augustine tells us. 29 Now all men know the truth
in a certain measure, at least, as to the common principles
of the Natural Law. As to the other truths, they partake
of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less. And in
this respect they know the Eternal Law in a greater or
lesser degree.
IX. THE ETERNAL LAW KNOWN THROUGH
THE NATURAL LAW
The Eternal Law is known to us through the Natural
Law, but is nonetheless prior to every other law, to Natural Law, as well as to all Human Law. Furthermore, it is
the very basis and source of every other law.
28 St. Thomas, Summa, 1-11, Quest. 93, Art. 2.
29 De Vera Religion*, XXXI, PL 34, 147.
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The Eternal Law existed in God before the created
world existed, just as the architect's plan preceded the
construction of the Empire State Building. This same
Eternal Law was even promulgated before the world appeared, despite the fact that its promulgation was not
received until creatures existed.
X. THE PROMULGATION OF THE
ETERNAL LAW
In view of what has just been stated, it may well be
objected that any law is meaningless, which is enacted or
promulgated before the very existence of the subjects for
whom it is intended. Now we know that the Eternal Law,
destined for the created world, existed before the creation
of mankind.
If the Eternal Law had been intended only as a mere
means to creatures, then it would indeed have been absurd to promulgate it to nonexistent creatures. But the
Eternal Law, as we have seen, is not merely and solely a
means to something beyond itself. Like the Natural Law,
the Eternal Law has the character of a directing principle, in itself. It directs things to their proper end. It is
the Wisdom of God Himself, Who is the Creator and Su30
preme Legislator of mankind.

It is obvious that the Eternal Law did not produce its
effects until the world existed and until the conditions of
its fulfillment were realized. But since the Eternal Law is
not distinct from God Himself, it had attained its end,
30 St. Thomas, Summa, I-II, Quest. 90, Art. 4; Quest. 93, Art. 2.
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even before created beings were called into being, by
the omnipotent Creator and Supreme Legislator, Who
"speaks to nonexistent beings, as though they were
existent."

31

XI. LAW AS AN ORDINANCE OF
RIGHT REASON
In view of the fact that Human Law emanates from the
Divine Eternal Law, it is easy to understand, why it has
the nature of a true law, only in so far as it partakes of
right reason. Should Human Law deviate from right
reason, it becomes thereby an iniquitous law. Such an
unjust law would not have the nature of an ordinance of
right reason, but would be the unauthorized enactment
of unconscionable tyranny.
It is hardly possible, while speaking in this Building, to
mention tyrants who take God out of law, by fist or force,
without alluding to the case of St. Thomas More, whose
stately statue guards the west portal of this College of
Law, and whose family escutcheon graces the inner archway of its Main Entrance. As Chesterton has well said of
this man who was beheaded in 1535, and canonized a
Saint in 1935:

-

"The mind of More was a diamond, that a tyrant
king threw into the ditch because he could not
break it."
Whenever we treat of unjust laws, of tyrants and of
dictators, we must always bear in mind the teaching of
another St. Thomas, the Angelic Doctor. He warns us,
31 St. Paul, Epistle to the Romans, 4, 17.
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that even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some semblance of law, in view of the fact that it is enacted by one
who is in power, is derived in this way from the Eternal
Law, for all power is from God.32 Thus St. Paul urges
the Romans: "Let everyone be subject to the higher authorities,
for there exists no authority except from God, and
those who exist have been appointed by God." 33
XII. EXTENSION OF THE ETERNAL LAW
TO THINGS BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF HUMAN LAW
St. Thomas concludes his discussion of the derivation
of all laws from the Eternal Law by a very practical consideration. He reasons thus:
"Human Law is said to permit certain things, not
as approving of them, but as being unable to direct
them. And many things are directed by the Divine
Law, which Human Law is unable to direct, because
more things are subject to a higher than to a lower
cause. Hence, this very fact comes under the ordination of the Eternal Law, that Human Law does not
concern itself with matters it cannot direct. It would
be different, were Human Law to sanction what the
Eternal Law condemns. Consequently, it does not
follow that Human Law is not derived from the Eter32 St. Thomas, Summa, I-II, Que:,t. 93, Art. 3, ad 2; Pope Leo XIII,
Encyclical Letter, "Libertas Praestantissimum," June 20, 1888, The Great
Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII, 144-145.
33 St. Paul, Epistle to the Romans, 13, 1; Fernand Prat, The Theology
of St. Paul, II, 322-332.
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nal Law. What does follow, is rather that it is not
on a perfect equality with it." 34
From this we clearly discern why Pope Pius XI stated
that:
"The Church teaches-since she alone has been
given by God the mandate and the right to teach
with authority-that not only our acts, as individuals,
but as groups and Nations, must conform to the Eternal Law of God. In fact, it is much more important
that the acts of a Nation follow God's law, since on
the Nation rests a much greater responsibility for the
consequence of its acts, than on the individual." 35
XIII. ENDURING STABILITY OF CHANGELESS
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Since all true law emanates in some way from the
Divine Authority of the Eternal Law we see how lamentable are the errors of those moderns who seem to think
that everything in this world is in a perpetual and planless
state of ever-shifting mutation, like the sand dunes of Indiana. Only a few months ago, in fact, on April thirtieth
of this year, a District Judge of New Jersey wrote these
words in his opinion:
"As we have seen, the generally accepted rules of
morality or ethics fluctuate in each era and the best
we can do with the subject is to apply the generally
accepted rules of our own day." 36
34 St. Thomas, Summa, I-II, Quest. 93, Art. 3, ad 3.
35 Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, "Ubi Arcano Dei," A.A.S. XIV
(1922), 689.
36 Petition of Smith, 71 Fed. Supp. 972 (D. N. J. 1947).
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This type of error is one of the saddest commentaries on
the status of our legal thinking of today. As a result, our
present-day judicial opinions and our legal writings are,
in large measure, a curious admixture of errors, platitudes,
sophisms and half-truths. Speaking of half-truths, we are
reminded of what Stephan Leacock once said about
them:
"Half-truths, like half-bricks, are more dangerous
than whole ones: they go further."
As we envision the future of American legal thinking, it
is not the persecution of the concentration camp, nor even
the execution in the prison-yard, that is to be feared, but
rather the imperceptible corruption of the American legal
mind by the insidious Trojan-horse system of infiltration
of false principles. This precisely is the most alarming
attack on our American thinking at the present time.
Legal thought in America is entering upon a new era.
The age of confused paganism opposing Christianity is
more or less at an end. The Christian legal system, as a
system of values and moral standards is being attacked, or
more correctly, is being betrayed, more insidiously than
ever before, perhaps, in the history of mankind.
The persuasive infiltration of a de-Christianized, godless, and even anti-God system of law converging on the
Christian citadel of truth from all sides, mocking its morality and ridiculing its basic principles even of the Divine
Eternal Law, calls for the defence, not only of heroic wills,
but of sturdy, enlightened legal minds, firmly grounded in
the abiding principles of eternal truth. Today as never
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before in the history of American law, a veritable Niagara
of high-sounding legal terms, of catch-words, of cliches,
of dithyrambic verbiage, of what the men in service contemptuously called "Gobbledygook," tumbles from the
legal printing presses, in a tiresome cascade of ceaseless
repetition, and thus seeks to conceal in meaningless
phrases, the shallowness and poverty of thought, charac37
teristic of an age that has lost its grip on God.
XIV. THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL THINGS
UNDER THE HEADSHIP OF CHRIST
In conclusion, may we be permitted to remind you that
imbedded in the wall overlooking the Main Entrance of
the Library of this College of Law is a beautiful plaque,
chiseled from infrangible stone, of Christ, the King, the
Author of the Eternal Law and the Legislator of a true,
everlasting Kingdom. As we view this statue of a Divine
King and Supreme Lawgiver let us not forget that the
first struggle recorded in all history, was that of a battle
in Heaven over a law and over a Kingdom, that is, the
Kingdom of Christ, the Author of the Divine Eternal
Law, against the lawless, arrogant, war-mongering, rebel
kingdom of Satan.
May one of the blessed results of this Natural Law Institute be that America and the world may more and more
37 Two volumes issued in recent years exemplify the sad state of American legal writing at the present time. A curious commixture of erroneous
expressions, ponderous platitudes, sophisms and half-truths will be found,
in large measure, in: My Philosophy of Law, Credos of Sixteen American
Scholars, (Boston, 1941), and Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies,
Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound, (New York, 1947).
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look to Christ, the Author of the Eternal Law and Supreme Legislator, for guidance in the principles and problems of all law. May Our Divine Lord become for every
lawyer, every upright citizen, every State, and every Nation the true Lawgiver, directing lives, ennobling hearts,
and divinizing souls.
We began this Paper with a reference to the Papal Encyclical of a quarter of a century ago. That span of time,
we know full well, seems very long to you young men,
but it is only a faded memory to the old. May the next
twenty-five years witness the personal dedication of the
lives of all present, to the cause of justice and truth, to the
spread of the correct concepts of the Natural Law and the
Eternal Law among mankind.
May this College of Law become a veritable trystingplace of the immutable principles of Divine Justice. And
may it become, ever more and more, a temple of abiding
truth, with its foundations firmly grounded in the imperishable cornerstone of God's Eternal Law.
For all of us, whether young or old, it is later than we
think in the present-day struggle for the enduring, unchanging principles of law. For all, whether young or
old, the years are passing swiftly, and swiftly the decades
follow. May our lives be so truly dedicated to the cause
of justice and of truth that we may be privileged to share
fully and eternally in what the Preface of the Mass of the
Feast of Christ the King so beautifully calls an eternal
and everlasting Kingdom:
"A Kingdom of truth and of life,
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A Kingdom of holiness and of grace,
A Kingdom of justice, of love and of peace":
That abiding Peace of Christ,
In the Kingdom of Christ.
Under God, then, may our sharing in this Kingdom, with
all men of good will, be so genuine, our study of the Eternal Law be so devoted, our endeavors be so constant,
our efforts so fruitful, that truly Christian governmentsfounded on the principles of the Eternal Law--of the people, by the people, and for the people may not perish from
the earth.
Rev. W. J.Doheny, C.S.C.

